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ABSTARCT
The essays in this dissertation explore the challenges of primary school
attendance and the timing of enrollment in primary school in a typical developing
country where child labor is widely practiced and poor households have limited
access to school. The rst essay assesses if when a child was born relative to his/her
siblings aect whether the child attends school or participates in child labor. I
investigate this question by estimating the eect of birth order on the probabilities
of school attendance and child labor participation. Endogeneity of family size may
bias the coecient estimate of birth order since high birth order children are
observed only in larger families, and parents who choose to have more kids may be
inherently dierent and children in these families would have worse outcome
regardless of family size and birth order. To address the endogeneity of family size, I
use instrumental variable approach where the proportion of boys in the family is
used to instrument family size. Using a longitudinal household survey data from
Ethiopia, I estimate unobserved eect bivariate probit instrumental variable model
of school attendance and child labor choices. The results suggest that the
probability of child labor participation decreases with birth order, but I nd no
evidence that suggests birth order aects the probability of school attendance.
However, among children who are going to school, hours spent studying increases
with birth order.
The second essay oers empirical evidence on whether access to primary
school induces children to enroll in primary school at the legal enrollment age using
household survey data from Ethiopia. I exploit the variation in the intensity of the
xiv
impact of the education reform across districts in Ethiopia to identify the eect of
access to school on the timing of enrollment. Using pre-reform enrollment rate in
primary school to measure the variation in the intensity of the impact of the reform,
I estimate dierence-in-dierences models. The results suggest that the reform has
substantially increased the probability the child enrolls in grade 1 by age 7. It is
also found out that the reform has decreased age at enrollment in grade 1 by about
4 months. These estimates highlight an important role that access to school plays in
inducing parents to enroll their kids in primary school at the legal enrollment age.
1INTRODUCTION
The essays in this dissertation examine barriers to primary education and
the timing of enrollment in primary school in the context of a developing country.
The prevalence of child labor in most developing countries substantially alters both
the costs and benets of school attendance. However, the eects of child labor on
the costs and benets of school attendance vary across children depending on child
and family characteristics. This leads to dierences in the educational achievement
and labor market earnings of siblings who shared the same family and neighborhood
background. This will be explored in essay 1, focusing on the eect of birth order on
the child's time allocation between child labor obligations and schooling
opportunities. Access to school also interacts with child labor in a number of
important ways and inuence both school starting age and completed years of
schooling. Though the standard human capital models suggest it is optimal to start
school as early as possible, this might not be the case in the presence of child labor
where longer travel time to school further increases the opportunity cost of school
attendance. Thus, the second essay examines the problem of overage primary school
enrollment.
Investment in education ensures that a country will have the most
productive labor force in the long run. Unfortunately, parents in low income
countries cannot aord to adequately invest in their children, rendering the next
generation of workers to join the adult labor market with lower productivity.
Consider the case of Ethiopia. One in every thirteen new borns does not celebrate
her/his rst year birthday. Among those who celebrated their rst year birthdays
2and younger than ve years, 47% are malnourished (EDHS, 2005). Besides, about
21% of school-age children could not make it to school (MoFED, 2008). Even those
who made it, do not have the luxury of being full time students. They are also
expected to assist their parents either in household chores, family farm, or work
somewhere else for money. Child labor is too crucial for poor families in Ethiopia
that some children even start working at the age of 4 (Admassie, 2002), and it
remains to be part of the children's daily routine throughout their childhood,
regardless of their school attendance status.
Though these types of statistics, aggregated at a national level, are
interesting and have their own merits, they conceal important variations in human
capital investment in children across households and siblings. They do not tell us,
for instance, why siblings who grew up in the same family and shared the same
community background may have dierent educational achievements. The rst
essay takes on this question and examines the role of birth order on the child's time
allocation between child labor and schooling, a decision that eventually aects the
child's educational achievement and labor market earnings later in life.
One of the empirical challenges of birth order studies is endogeneity of family
size. This is because high birth order children are observed in larger families, and
larger families may be inherently dierent and children in these families would have
worse outcome regardless of family size and birth order. Thus, it is crucial to
address the endogeneity of family size. I attempt to mitigate endogeneity of family
size by exploiting the fact that Ethiopian parents prefer boys to girls and estimating
unobserved eect bivariate probit instrumental variable (IV) model of child labor
and schooling choices using longitudinal household survey data from Ethiopia.
The results reveal that an increase in birth order by one unit decreases the
probability of working as child laborer by 5 percentage point, but I nd no evidence
that suggests birth order aects the probability of school attendance. However,
3among children who are going to school, a one unit increase in birth order increases
the time the child spends studying by 1.9 hours per day.
The second essay investigates the eect of access to primary school on the
timing of enrollment. Though a large proportion of children in many developing
countries enroll in primary school long after the legal enrollment age (Barro & Lee,
2001), the bulk of the literature focuses on enrollment rate, without considering age
at enrollment. Delaying enrollment is costly as it, for example, decreases an
individual's life time wealth by about 6% (Glewwe & Jacoby, 1995), and it increases
grade repetition and school dropout rates (Wils, 2004). Given the high incidence of
delayed enrollment in developing countries and the cost associated with it, the topic
did not receive the attention it deserves, and we have limited understanding of why
many children in developing countries do not enroll in primary school at the
prescribed age. The second essay attempts to bridge this gap in the literature by
examining the eect of access to school on the timing of enrollment using household
survey data from Ethiopia.
To mitigate the potential endogeneity of access to school in the regression
framework, I exploit the education reform in Ethiopia as exogenous source of
variation in access to school. Between 1997 and 2004, the Ethiopian government
implemented Educational Sector Development Program which resulted in the
construction of 2,398 primary schools throughout the country. Though the program
has increased access to school at a national level, the intensity of the impact of the
program vary across districts in Ethiopia. Using the variation in the impact of the
intensity of the program and household survey data administered during the years
1996 and 2004 as pre- and post-program data, respectively, I estimate
dierence-in-dierences model.
Overall the results suggest that the education program has increased the
probability of enrollment in grade 1 by age 7, the legal enrollment age in Ethiopia,
4by more than 35%. It is also found out that the program has decreased age at
enrollment in grade 1 by 4 months, which is about 3.6% decrease from its
pre-program average age (at enrollment in grade 1) of 9.3 years. These estimates
highlight an important role that access to school plays in inducing parents to enroll
their kids in primary school at the legal enrollment age.
This dissertation enhances our understanding of the educational choices faced
by households in low income countries where child labor is an important day to day
reality. The two educational choices studied in detail are primary school attendance
and the age at which a child enrolls in grade 1. In doing so, the dissertation employs
appropriate methods and data sets from a representative low income country to
investigate insuciently explored aspects of human capital acquisition.
Moreover, it provides important policy implications by oering empirical
evidence on the potential causes and implications of educational inequalities across
siblings and by evaluating the eect of educational policy intervention on the timing
of enrollment in primary school.
The results from essay 1 suggest that the probability of participation in child
labor and the hours students spend studying vary by birth order. Hence, policies
that attempt to narrow down educational inequalities through school expansion may
not be eective if parents selectively send specic birth-order children to school. On
the other hand, policies that aim at increasing household income decrease the child
labor obligation placed on children and may decrease siblings' education inequality
in poor households. The second essay, on the other hand, documents that an
education intervention in Ethiopia, which was designed to increase enrollment rate,
has increased the probability of on-time enrollment. This nding is consistent with
the argument that access to school induces households to enroll their children in
school at the legal enrollment age. Thus, improving communication networks and
5public transport may supplement policies that are designed to encourage households
to enroll their children in primary school on time.
6I. BIRTH ORDER AND CHILDREN'S TIME ALLOCATION
1.1 Introduction
Even if it is relatively easier to understand why two randomly chosen
unrelated individuals may dier in their educational achievements, it is not clear
why siblings who grew up in the same family and shared the same community
background have dierent educational achievement. The literature that attempts to
decompose the sources of economic inequalities into between and within families
dierences { i.e., sibling correlation studies1 { shows that there is a considerable
variation in the educational achievement and other important economic aspects of
siblings.
In the US, for instance, the variance in the permanent component of siblings'
log earnings is estimated to be somewhere around 40% (see, Solon, 1999, for a
review of the literature on siblings correlation). This suggests that 40% of earning
inequalities are attributed to shared family and community background such as
neighborhood and school qualities, while the remaining 60% is due to factors which
are not shared by siblings, including, but not limited to, genetic traits, gender, birth
order, and sibling-specic parenting.
Studies from developing countries also arrived at a more or less similar
conclusion. For instance, within families dierence account for about 37% of the
1 Studies that investigate the eect of family background on children's economic outcomes de-
compose the sources of economic inequalities into between and within family dierences. These
studies typically estimate sibling correlation in important economic outcomes such as earnings and
schooling using analysis of variance. The idea is that sibling correlation is a summary measure of the
eect of shared family and community background, and hence if siblings have more similar economic
outcomes than randomly chosen unrelated individuals, then we expect higher sibling correlation.
7total variances in completion of elementary school in rural Albania (Picard & Wol,
2008). Similarly, a simple variance analysis shows that only about half of the total
variation in completed education in Laguna Province, Philippines is explained by
between families dierence (Ejrnaes & Prtner, 2004).
A potential explanation for dierences in educational outcomes of siblings
and their labor market earnings later in life is the role of parental action. Even
parents who are equally concerned about their children may invest more in the
education of the more endowed child and compensate the less endowed one by
leaving more bequests (Becker & Tomes, 1976). In low income countries, however,
poor parents do not have the resource to make such compensation, but they create a
sizable dierence in the educational achievement of siblings, primarily through
specializing some of their children for child labor and the others for school
(Horowitz & Wang, 2004).
The widespread practice of child labor in developing countries2 partly
explains dierences in the educational achievements of children in developing
countries. One important feature of child labor in many developing countries is that
it is not a full time activity. Rather, children participate in low intensive child labor
such as helping their mothers in household chores or their fathers on family farm for
few hours per day, leaving the children with few more hours either to attend school
or remain ideal (see Basu, 1999, for a survey of the literature on child labor).
Siblings in a given family also do not necessarily participate in equally demanding
work; some may work full time, others work on a part time basis, and some others
2 The report from International Labor Organization reveals that there were 153 million child
laborers in the world in 2008 (Diallo, 2010). In Ethiopia, the focus of the present study, 37% of the
children below 15 years reported working as their primary activity, while only 14% reported school
attendance as their primary activity in 1999. Moreover, 12% of the children has started working by
age 4 (Admassie, 2002). Putting aside its moral, psychological, and other non-economic costs, child
labor interferes with children's human capital accumulation process. Prior empirical studies have
shown that child labor decreases the probability of being in school, and for those who are in school,
it hinders their educational achievement and decreases the hours students spend in school (Beegle
et al., 2009; Ravallion & Wodon, 2000; Cavalieri, 2002; Boozer & Suri, 2001).
8do not work at all. Parents allocate children's time between school attendance and
child labor based on siblings' comparative advantage in these two activities
(Edmonds, 2006), which in turn depends on a number of child attributes such as
birth order, health, ability, age, and gender.
In this essay, I investigate the eect of birth order on the probabilities of
school attendance and participation in child labor. Since parents jointly allocate the
child's time between these two activities, estimating a bivariate probit model is
appropriate. The bivariate probit model consists of two equations: the rst equation
contains the school attendance probability, and the second one is the probability of
participating in child labor. The bivariate probit model is estimated using
longitudinal household survey data from Ethiopia. Unlike most studies from low
income countries, the longitudinal data used in this essay report the actual number
of hours children spend on dierent activities. This reduces bias from measurement
error relative to using data that only have binary indicators for child labor, school
attendance, and other activities.
The role of birth order in children's outcome is widely documented in the
literature. In developed countries, the vast majority of these studies conclude that
rst-born children have better outcomes in a number of aspects including
educational achievement and labor market earnings. In low income countries, on the
contrary, most studies suggest that later-born children achieve more years of
schooling. Most of the birth order studies, particularly those that use data from low
income countries, however, did not convincingly treat endogeneity of family size.
This is a serious problem as high birth order children are observed only in large
families. For instance, a 5th child is observed only in families with at least 5
children. If parents who choose to have more kids are inherently dierent and
children in these families have worse outcome regardless of family size and birth
order, then the coecient estimate of birth order is biased.
9Endogeneity of family size can be mitigated by nding appropriate
instrumental variable (IV) for family size and estimating IV models. In this essay, I
attempt to mitigate endogeneity of family size by exploiting the fact that Ethiopian
parents prefer boys to girls to construct an instrumental variable for family size.
Specically, the proportion of boys in the family is used to instrument family size
and unobserved eect bivariate probit IV model of child labor and schooling choices
are estimated.
Overall, the results reveal that an increase in birth order by one unit
decreases the probability of child labor participation by 5 percentage point, whereas
it has no eect whether the child attends school or not. However, among children
who are going to school, a one unit increase in birth order increases the time the
child spends studying by 1.9 hours per day. Since 8 child age dummies are included
to control for the age of the child, it is not age dierence that is driving the results.
Comparison of estimates from unobserved eect bivariate probit model and
unobserved eect bivariate probit IV model suggest that endogeneity of family size
potentially bias birth order estimates in school attendance regressions, but not in
child labor regressions.
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. The following section
provides additional background information on the role of birth order, and Section
1.3 presents the theoretical framework. Section 1.4 describes the data, while Section
1.5 discusses the methodology, outlines the empirical approach, and presents the
rst stage estimates. The main results are reported in Section 1.6, and the last
section concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
At rst glance it may seem that when a child is born relative to his or her
siblings does not matter at all. But for a number of economic and other reasons
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(discussed in Section 1.3), the birth order of the child has a signicant and
meaningful eect on important children's outcomes, including educational
achievement and labor market earnings. The literature that links birth order with
children's outcome is well developed; studies from developed countries have
documented that rst-born children achieve more years of education, earn more, are
more likely to attend private schools, are less likely to held back in school, are more
likely to have full time employment, and, for girls, are less likely to give birth while
teenagers (Conley & Glauber, 2006; Booth & Kee, 2008; Gary-Bobo et al., 2006;
Iacovou, 2001; Black et al., 2005). On the other hand, studies that use data from
low income countries tell a dierent story: later-born children complete more years
of schooling and are less likely to participate in child labor (Ejrnaes & Prtner, 2004;
Emerson & Souza, 2008; Edmonds, 2006).
The wealth model (Becker, 1991; Ejrnaes & Prtner, 2004) suggests that
parents invest in the child's human capital until the marginal return to education
equals the market rate of return. In developing countries, where child labor is
widely practiced and parents are too poor to send all their children to school at the
same time, this may mean that parents send some of their children to school and
the others to work.3 How the child's time is allocated between school and child
labor is an empirical one, but Edmonds (2006) and Emerson & Souza (2008) argue
that it is based on the child's comparative advantage in school and child labor,
which, in turn, depends on the child's endowment. Ejrnaes & Prtner (2004)
explicitly consider birth order as one type of endowment and show that birth order
aects investment in children even without assuming parental preference for specic
birth order children and genetic endowments vary by birth order.
3 It is important to note that parents send their kids to work not because parents are selsh; it is
because, for poor families, sending their kids to work is crucial for the households' survival. (Basu
& Van, 1998).
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On methodological side, endogeneity of family size is one of the empirical
challenges of birth order studies. Obviously, high birth order children are observed
in relatively larger families, and larger families may be inherently dierent and
children in these families would have worse outcome regardless of family size and
birth order. Thus, it is crucial to address the endogeneity of family size. One
possible solution is to estimate separate outcome equation by restricting the sample
to each observed family size in the data. Generally speaking, this is not practical
since most surveys to date have small number of observations to allow precise
estimate by family size. However, Black et al. (2005) could do so using a unique
data set on the entire population of Norway.
A more common and practical approach is to look for exogenous variation in
family size and estimate instrumental variable model. The occurrence of twin births
and siblings sex composition are the two widely used instrumental variables.
Twinning is historically the most popular one; recently, however, following Angrist
& Evans (1998), use of siblings sex composition is increasing in the literature. This
may be partly because using twin births as instrumental variable demands large
data sets since twin births occur rarely.
The basic idea in using siblings sex composition as exogenous variation in
family size is that parents in a two child family prefer to have mixed sex children (a
girl and a boy) to same sex children (two boys or two girls). Hence, families with
same sex siblings in the rst two births are more likely to have an additional child.
The data from developed countries support this argument, and a number of
researchers have used it to instrument family size. Angrist & Evans (1998) are the
rst to use siblings sex composition as exogenous variation in family size in their
study of the causal eect of family size on the labor supply of mothers in the US.
Following Angrist & Evans (1998), a number of birth order studies in developed
countries use siblings sex composition to instrument family size in their attempt to
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estimate the causal eect of birth order on children's outcome (Conley & Glauber,
2006; Black et al., 2005; de Haan, 2010).4
Unfortunately, birth order studies that use data from developing countries
have not yet convincingly disentangled the eect of family size and birth order.
Thus, it is not clear whether the documented birth order eect on children's
outcome is causal. This could be partly due to data limitation. Besides, families in
developing countries are early in their fertility transition with high fertility rate
which makes unreasonable to consider twin births as major shocks in family size.
Angrist et al. (2010) employ both the occurrence of twin births and siblings sex
composition to instrument family size in their study of quality-quantity trade-o
among children in Israel, a country somehow falls between developed and developing
countries with respect to its fertility rate. They also exploit preference for boys by
traditional Israeli families to instrument family size, and they nd out that, among
Asian and African Jew families in Israel that have mixed sex siblings in the rst two
births, having a boy in the third birth decreases the probability of having an
additional child, implying parents prefer boys to girls.
This essay builds on Angrist et al. (2010) and uses siblings sex composition
as exogenous source of variation in family size since Ethiopian parents prefer boys
to girls. Given the history of war and less developed police force, particularly in
rural areas, Short & Kiros (2002) argue, bravery and physical strength are highly
valued in Ethiopian families. Since men supposedly have these essential features,
Ethiopian parents prefer boys to girls.
4 Goux & Maurin (2005) also employ similar instrumental variable for family size when they assess
the eect of overcrowded housing on children's performance at school.
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1.3 Theoretical Model
Why We Expect Birth Order Eects
There are a number of reasons why we expect children's outcome to vary by
birth order. First, children of dierent birth order face dierent household
environment. Probably the most obvious one is dierences in household size;
particularly, we expect later-born children to reside in relatively larger families, and
this reduces the total parental time they receive. It is also obvious that children of
dierent birth order face a household with dierent age and sex composition, which
in turn have their own eects on children's outcome. Another interesting dierence
that dierent birth order children experience in the household is its intellectual
environment. Zajonc (1976) argues that earlier born children have an advantage
since they grow up in a household with better intellectual environment, i.e., higher
average education.
Second, credit constraint induces birth order eects. If parental income
increases over their life time, later-born children reside in relatively richer families.
On the other hand, imperfect credit market forces families to decrease per child
spending with family size. Credit constraint also interacts with child labor. It is not
uncommon for credit constrained families to supplement the family income with
income from child labor, and this may involve sending the most productive child to
work. If, say, earlier-born children are more productive, then we expect them to
spend more time working.
Third, birth order eects can be a result of parents' preferences. In
communities where, for instance, children are considered as security for old age,
parents may favor earlier-born children as they become economically independent
earlier (Horton, 1988). Even if parents equally care for their children, birth order
eects exist if endowments dier by birth order. For instance, if earlier-born
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children are well endowed, parents invest more human capital on earlier-born
children and compensate later-born, and less endowed, children by investing more
nonhuman capital (e.g., bequest) as predicted by Becker & Tomes (1976).
Fourth, later-born children are biologically disadvantaged as they are born
with older mothers who are more likely to give low birth weight babies.
Theoretical Model
To sketch the potential eect of birth order on child labor and school
attendance choices, consider the simplied version of models developed by Edmonds
(2006) and Baland & Robinson (2000). Assume a unitary family where its members
live for only two periods, and parents equally care for their children but are too
poor to leave bequests. Assume there is no capital market, and transfer from
children to parents is not allowed as well. Also, assume there are n children in the
household and they are identical except in their birth order and other attributes
related to birth order such as age.
In the rst period, child i (with birth order bi) spends ei hours in school and
works for li (= 1  ei) hours. Parents, on the other hand, supply inelastic labor of
Lp hours at a competitive market wage of wp. Child wage is a function of birth
order as w(bi).
5 The total household consumption in period 1 is:
C = wpLp +
X
w(bi)(1  ei): (1.1)
In period 2, when children leave home and form independent households,
their consumption depends on the human capital they accumulated in period 1.
The human capital accumulation process is represented by h(ei; bi). The birth order
enters in the function to capture factors that vary by birth order and also inuence
5 Edmonds (2006) and Emerson & Souza (2008) argue wage decreases with birth order since older
children are more productive. This, however, does not necessarily reect birth order eect. Hence,
in this essay, it is only assumed that wage varies by birth order.
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the human capital production such as ability, but there is no strong theoretical
ground to suggest the direction of the relationship. Thus, the sign of @h
@bi
is
ambiguous. However, h is assumed to be twice dierentiable, strictly increasing
( @h
@ei
> 0), and concave (@
2h
@e2i
< 0) in e.
Assuming parents' labor supply and adult wage are constant across periods,
children and parents' consumption in period 2 are respectively,
ci = h(ei; bi) (1.2)
and
cp = wpLp: (1.3)
Over the course of their life, parents derive utility from total household
consumption in period 1 (C), their consumption in period 2 (cp), and the sum of
their children's consumption in period 2 (
P
ci). It is summarized by the following
relations:
U = u1 + u2
u1 = u(C)
u2 = u(cp) + u(
X
ci);
where the superscripts denote the two periods. Therefore, parents maximize
U = u(C) + u(cp) + u(
X
ci) (1.4)
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subject to equations (1.1), (1.2), and (1.3). The resulting rst order conditions with
respect to ei are
  @u
@C
w(bi) +
@u
@
P
ci
@h
@ei
= 0; i = 1 : : : n:
Rearranging the rst order conditions gives us
@u
@C
@u
@
P
ci
=
@h
@ei
w(bi)
(1.5)
The left hand side of equation (1.5) does not vary across siblings. Thus, at
equilibrium, for any two children in the household, wage adjusted marginal returns
to education are equal, i.e., for any two siblings i and j,
@h
@ei
w(bi)
=
@h
@ej
w(bj)
: (1.6)
Equation (1.6) tells us that parents allocate children's time across labor market
obligations and education opportunities based on siblings' comparative advantage.
Hence, for time allocation to vary by birth order, marginal returns to education and
child labor should vary by birth order. For example, if a rst-born child is more
talented and has higher returns to education, satisfying the rst order condition
(equation (1.6)) requires the child to spend more time in school. If, on the other
hand, the rst-born child commands higher wage, the child spends more time
working.
1.4 Data
In this essay, I use longitudinal household survey data from Ethiopia which
was administered by Young Lives, an international research project based in the
University of Oxford. As part of the project, data on children from four low income
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countries { Ethiopia, India (in the Andhra Pradesh state), Peru, and Vietnam {
have been collected. During the rst survey round of data collection in 2002, 2,000
one year old children (hereafter \younger" cohort) and 1,000 eight years old children
(hereafter \older" cohort) were surveyed in each country. Following up, in 2006 and
2009, the same children were tracked and surveyed when the \younger" cohort
children turned to ve and eight years old, and the \older" cohort children turned
to twelve and fteen years old, respectively. I specically use the Ethiopian part of
the data from the 2006 and 2009 survey rounds of \older" cohort children. Data
from the \younger" cohort surveys are not used in the analysis as most of the
children in this cohort were too young (around eight years old) to go to school at
the time of the survey.6
In the Ethiopian part of the survey, children were randomly sampled from 20
semi-purposively selected sentinel sites in the ve largest regions of the country:
Addis Ababa, Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR (Southern Nations, Nationalities, and
People's Region), and Tigray (see Wilson et al., 2006, for a discussion on the
sampling design). The data contain a wealth of information on children, household
demographics, and community characteristics.
In 2006 and 2009 survey rounds, eight activities were identied and the
number of hours children between the age of 5 and 17 years spend on each of these
activities in the last week is reported.7 This enables me to observe how children
spend their time more accurately. Though information on time use was collected on
children between the age of 5 and 17 years, only children between the age of 7 and
6 Though the legal school starting age is 7 in Ethiopia, it is not uncommon for most children in
developing countries like Ethiopia to delay primary school enrollment by few years beyond the legal
school starting age (Barro & Lee, 2000).
7 The eight activities included in the surveys are: domestic work (fetching water, fetching rewood,
cleaning, cooking, washing, shopping, etc), unpaid work (family farm, cattle herding, shepherding
and other family businesses), paid work (activities for pay/sale outside of household), caring for
others (younger siblings and ill household members), school (including traveling time to school),
studying (outside of school time such as at home or extra tuition), playing (including time taken for
eating, drinking and bathing) and sleeping.
18
15 years are included in the analysis. Children below 7 and above 15 years old are
excluded, respectively, because compulsory school starting age in Ethiopia is 7 years
and the International Labor Organization's (ILO's) Convention No. 138 species 15
years as the age above which a person may participate in economic activity. I
further restrict the original sample of households to those with at least two resident
children between the age of 7 and 15 at the time of the surveys. This leaves us with
the nal sample size of 1,919 children.
The two dependent variables in the bivariate probit model estimated in this
essay (see Section 1.5 for detail) are binary indicators for school attendance and
child labor participation, where school attendance is 1 if the child attends school,
and 0 otherwise. Similarly, child labor participation takes a value of 1 if the child
spends more than 14 hours per week on noneconomic activities such as household
chores, and 0 otherwise.8 Table 1.1 presents the fraction of children who attend
school and participate in child labor.9 About 89.8% of the children in the sample
attend school, and of those who attend school, 77.7% participate in child labor. On
the other hand, 78.6% of children in the sample participates in child labor, and
among these children, only 11.3% do not attend school. As mentioned earlier, the
table conrms that child labor in Ethiopia is not a full time activity for most
children. Rather, children work for few hours per day, leaving the children with few
more hours either to attend school or remain ideal.
Though child labor is common in Ethiopia, it is important to note that
working for pay is not that common. In our sample, only 8% (not reported here) of
children work for pay. The remaining 48%, 38%, and 7% of children, respectively,
involve in domestic work such as cooking, caring for their younger siblings and/or ill
household members, and participate in unpaid family work such as cattle herding.
8 The 14 hours per week cuto is chosen to be in line with ILO's denition of \light work" which
is working for 14 hours per week or less on noneconomic activities.
9 Table A.2 in Appendix A.2 provides marginal and joint frequencies for school attendance and
child labor.
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There is also child labor specialization by gender where girls tend to specialize in
domestic work and caring for others while boys specialize in unpaid work (see Table
A.3 in Appendix A.2 for a summary of child labor specialization by gender). Haile &
Haile (2012) also nd out child labor specialization in rural Ethiopia where girls are
more likely to participate in domestic chores while boys participate in market work.
Table 1.1: Fraction of Children Who Attend School and Participate in Child Labor
Child Labor
School Attendance No Yes Total
Row
%
Col % Row
%
Col % Row
%
Col %
No 12.8 6.1 87.2 11.3 100.0 10.2
Yes 22.3 93.9 77.7 88.7 100.0 89.8
Total 21.4 100.0 78.6 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Figures in the body of the table are conditional probabilities; marginal probabilities
are reported under \Total" row and column.
Birth order, the primary independent variable of interest, is constructed as a
continuous variable containing the birth order of (resident) children as 1, 2, 3, 4, etc.
Thus, the coecient estimate of birth order tells us the change in the probabilities
of school attendance and child labor participation for one unit increase in birth
order. The average birth order in the sample is approximately 3 which is expected
given the average number of kids in the family is about 5. (see Table 1.2 for
descriptive statistics)
The proportions of children attending school and participating in child labor
vary by birth order. Generally speaking, the probabilities of school attendance and
participation in child labor decreases with birth order (See Figure 1.1). This is
expected in non-adjusted relationship between birth order and school
attendance/child labor as age decreases with birth order and it is less likely for
younger kids either to attend school or participate in child labor.
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Figure 1.1: Fraction of Children Who Attend School and Work by Birth Order
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Table 1.2 presents the summary statistics of demographic variables that are
included as additional explanatory variables in the regression analysis.10 Generally
speaking, parental years of schooling, which controls for the socioeconomic status of
the family, shows that parents in the sample are less educated, with father's and
mother's years of schooling of 4 and 2, respectively. A binary indicator for
housemaid is also included as control variable since the presence of a housemaid
may reduce the child's labor obligation at home. In addition, I control for annual
family expenditure, which is a good proxy for permanent family income. Table 1.2
also presents the proportion of children by 8 age dummies, gender, and location
(urban versus rural). Finally, note that 19 village dummies are also included as
additional control variables in the regression analysis.
10 See Table A.1 in Appendix A.2 for detailed description of variables used in the regression analysis.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of Variables used in the Econometric Analysis
2006 2009
birth order 3.452 2.978
(1.634) (1.419)
number of kids 5.367 5.207
(1.746) (1.707)
proportion of boys in the HH 0.507 0.506
(0.220) (0.219)
Child's age = 7 0.108 0.000
(0.310) (0.000)
Child's age = 8 0.129 0.000
(0.335) (0.000)
Child's age = 9 0.125 0.005
(0.331) (0.073)
Child's age = 10 0.102 0.109
(0.303) (0.312)
Child's age = 11 0.238 0.119
(0.426) (0.324)
Child's age = 12 0.297 0.136
(0.457) (0.343)
Child's age = 13 0.001 0.102
(0.032) (0.303)
Child's age = 14 0.000 0.229
(0.000) (0.421)
Child's age = 15 0.000 0.299
(0.000) (0.458)
child is a girl (yes=1) 0.482 0.474
(0.500) (0.500)
housemaid (yes=1) 0.058 0.080
(0.234) (0.272)
father's schooling 3.824 3.881
(4.020) (4.034)
mother's schooling 2.278 2.284
(3.431) (3.442)
household expenditure 0.974 1.784
(0.744) (1.197)
urban (yes=1) 0.307 0.311
(0.462) (0.463)
Observations 986 933
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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1.5 Empirical Methodology, Identication, and First Stage Estimates
This section is organized as follows: the following subsection outlines the
empirical methodology. Subsections 1.5.2 and 1.5.3 respectively discuss the rst
stage IV results and validity of the instrument.
1.5.1 Empirical Methodology
The empirical objective here is to estimate the causal eect of birth order on
children's time allocation. It is assumed that parents are responsible to allocate
children's time between schooling and child labor, and parental utility diers by
alternative allocations. This gives us four possible combinations of children's
activities: children who are not enrolled in school and not working, those who are in
school and not working, those who are not in school but working, and those who are
in school and also working.
Since parents jointly allocate the child's time between child labor and school
attendance, unobserved eect bivariate probit model is estimated using maximum
likelihood procedure. The bivariate probit model consists of two equations: the rst
equation contains the school attendance (sit) probability, and the second one is the
probability of working as child laborer (lit). Following Cameron & Trivedi (2005),
let us dene the latent parental utility from allocating child i0s time on school and
child labor in year t, respectively, by
sit = sb orderit + sfamily sizeit + sXit + is + its; (1.7)
lit = lb orderit + lfamily sizeit + lXit + il + itl; (1.8)
where sit and lit are the corresponding observed dependent variables such that
sit = 1[s

it > 0] and lit = 1[l

it > 0], where 1[:] is an indicator function and is unity
whenever the statement in brackets is true, and zero otherwise. Here, b orderit
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represents the birth order of child i in year t, family sizeit denotes the number of
children in child i0s household in year t, and Xit is a vector of observable control
variables including a constant. i = fis; ilg are random variables representing
time invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity and it = fits; itlg are the
random error terms. Assume that it are jointly and normally distributed with
means zero, variances one, and correlation . If the error terms its and itl are
uncorrelated, i.e.,  = 0, the two equations can be estimated separately using probit
model. If  6= 0, bivariate probit model is appropriate.
The four possible outcomes can now be restated as (sit; lit) equals (0; 0) for
children not enrolled in school and not working, (1; 0) for children enrolled in school
and not working, (0; 1) for children not enrolled in school but working, and (1; 1) for
children enrolled in school and also working.
I am primarily interested to estimate s and l in equations (1.7) and (1.8),
the coecient estimates of birth order in school attendance and child labor
equations, respectively. However, as mentioned earlier, the birth order coecients
may pick up the eect of family size on the outcome variables as family size is
endogenous in equations (1.7) and (1.8). A potential source of endogeneity in our
case arises from the fact that high birth order children are observed only in larger
families. For instance, a 5th child is observed only in families with at least 5 children.
Endogeneity of family size can be mitigated by nding appropriate instrumental
variable for family size and estimating instrumental variable (IV) models.
In the context of estimating linear models using IV approach, family size is
rst regressed on instrumental variables, Z in equation (1.9), and other control
variables, then equations (1.7) and (1.8) are estimated after replacing the observed
family size in equation (1.7) and (1.8) by its predicted value from equation (1.9).
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The rst stage equation takes the form:
family sizeit = 0 + 1Zit + 2b orderit + 3Xit +  i + it; (1.9)
where it is the random error term and  i is time invariant unobserved individual
heterogeneity.
For the IV estimate to mitigate the bias due to endogeneity of family size in
equations (1.7) and (1.8), the excluded instruments, Z in equation (1.9), should be
strongly correlated with the endogenous variable, family size, but not with the
residuals of equations (1.7) and (1.8), its and itl. Bound et al. (1995) show that if
the excluded instrument is weakly correlated with the endogenous variable, then
even a weak correlation between the excluded instrument and the residual of the
structural equation, its and itl in equations (1.7) and (1.8), induces large
inconsistency in the IV estimates. Hence, it is crucial to implement an IV
methodology where the excluded instruments are both strongly correlated with
family size in equation (1.9) but not with the residuals of equations (1.7) and (1.8).
Children's sex composition is a potential candidate to instrument family size.
The argument is that if parents prefer to have mixed gender children (i.e., boys and
girls) to same gender children (i.e., all boys or all girls), then siblings' sex
composition is correlated with the number of kids parents have. In the US, for
instance, parents in a two child family are more likely to bear an additional child if
they have the same sex children (two boys or two girls) than those who have mixed
sex children (a boy and a girl) (see, for example, Angrist & Evans, 1998; Price,
2008).
In developing countries, high fertility rate and parents' preference for boys to
girls provide additional dimensions to the preference for mixed gender children.
Many studies from developing countries, including Ethiopia, have documented the
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presence of strong sons preference (see, for example, Angrist et al., 2010; Short &
Kiros, 2002). If parents have preference for boys to girls, then the proportion of
boys in the household aects parents' fertility decision; that is, the higher the
proportion of boys, the lower the probability for parents to bear an additional child,
and hence they will end up with a relatively smaller family size.
To x ideas, consider the case where parents care only about having two
sons. If parents are lucky enough to give birth to two boys in their rst two births,
then we expect them to stop child bearing, and hence the proportion of boys in this
family is 100%. If, on the other hand, they are not that lucky and have to wait
until, say, the tenth birth to give birth to the second boy, then the two boys account
for 20% of the children for this family. Obviously, the example is a bit extreme
where parents are considered as if they only care about having two sons, but it
demonstrates the possibility for a negative relationship between the proportion of
boys and the number of children in the family in the presence of sons preference.11
The negative correlation between the proportion of boys and family size can
be exploited to disentangle the eect of birth order and family size on children's
outcome - i.e., school attendance and child labor participation - as long as the
proportion of boys in the household does not aect children's outcome, except
indirectly through its eect on family size.12
In the standard two-stage least square (2SLS) regression, the rst step is to
estimate equation (1.9), the rst stage equation. Then, equations (1.7) and (1.8),
11 Some argue (e.g., Williamson, 1976) the relationship between the proportion of boys and family
size holds if parents have a taste for small or moderate family size since in large families a mix of
both genders is more likely to happen due to mere biological probability. This argument is valid
if parents care only about having at least one child of each gender. However, if parents prefer a
specic proportion of boys - say, more boys than girls - then preference for sons aect fertility even
if parents have a taste for larger family.
12 By construction, family size appears on both sides of equation (1.9): as a dependent variable
and a denominator of the excluded variable, proportion of boys in the household. Generally, this
could lead to a well know bias in labor economics called Borjas' division bias (Borjas, 1980) if there
is measurement error in family size. As in most household survey data, measurement error in family
size is not a serious problem in our data to make Borjas' division bias a serious concern.
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the second stage equations, are estimated after replacing the observed family size by
its predicted value from equation (1.9). In the context of non-linear second stage
equation, Terza et al. (2008) show that IV estimates obtained from 2SLS regression
are inconsistent. They, hence, suggest two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI). The
procedure in 2SRI and 2SLS are the same except that in 2SRI the endogenous
variable is not replaced by its predicted value in the second stage equation. Instead,
the predicted residual from the rst stage regression is included as an additional
variable in the second stage equation.
Since the outcome variables in equations (1.7) and (1.8) are dummy variables
and the two equations are modeled as bivariate probit, 2SRI procedure is employed
here, i.e., equations (1.7) and (1.8) are estimated where the observed family size is
not replaced by its predicted value, instead the predicted residual of equation (1.9)
is included as an additional control variable.13
1.5.2 First Stage IV results
As discussed above, we expect a negative relationship between the
proportion of boys and the number of kids in the family in the presence of son
preference, i.e., where parents prefer boys to girls.14 Table 1.3 presents the rst
stage results that depict this relationship. The rst two columns display results
from OLS regressions while the last two columns display that of household xed
eect regressions. Under both OLS and xed eect regressions, two equations are
estimated: one with only one excluded instrument, proportion of boys, and the
other with two excluded instruments, proportion of boys and an indicator variable
whether a family received support on family planning either from government or
13 See the technical note in Appendix A.1 for further description of the specication of the bivariate
probit model and the implementation of the IV approach in this specication.
14 See Table A.4 in Appendix A.2 for the fraction of families that has additional child by parity.
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non-government organizations. The latter is used to proxy family planning use,
which I do not observe.
For son preference to aect the number of kids in the family, parents should
be able to stop child bearing once they achieved the desired gender mix. That is
why controlling for family planning use is important in the rst stage regressions.
Admittedly, however, support on family planning may not be a good proxy for use
of family planning since access does not guarantee use. Moreover, the support could
target some group of the population, say poor or high fertility households, and this
may create selection bias. Given information on family planning use is not collected
and considering part of the problem is mitigated by estimating a xed eect model
that accounts for individual heterogeneity, support on family planning is used as a
proxy for family planning use, and hence as an additional excluded instrument (in
column 2 and 4 of Table 1.3) to see if results are sensitive to controlling family
planning use.
In the OLS regressions, the coecient estimates of the proportion of boys in
the family are insignicant in both specications. On the contrary, it is negative
and signicant in the xed eect regressions. The coecient estimate of the
proportion of boys in the family is about -2.5 in the xed eect regressions,
implying parents that have sons only have 2.5 fewer children than those that have
daughters only.15 This suggests parents prefer sons to daughters. The fact that the
coecient estimates of the proportion of boys in the xed eect regressions are
negative and signicant unlike that of in the OLS regressions suggests the presence
of individual heterogeneity in son preference. Though the proxy variable for family
planning use, support on family planning, is signicant in the OLS regressions, it is
insignicant in the xed eect regressions. Moreover, in the xed eect regressions,
15 Ethiopia is characterized by high fertility rate, with, for example, more than 5 kids per woman
in our sample. Given the high fertility rate and the presence of son preference, the magnitude of the
coecient estimate of the \proportion of boys in the family" variable (i.e., having 2.5 fewer children)
is not surprising.
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Table 1.3: First Stage Regression Results from the Linear Model
Dependent Variable: Number of Kids
Pooled OLS Fixed Eect
Reduced IV Full IV Reduced IV Full IV
proportion of boys -0.235 -0.217 -2.463 -2.483
(0.188) (0.187) (0.983) (0.986)
support 0.356 0.044
(0.094) (0.067)
birth order 0.712 0.715 1.014 1.014
(0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.030)
child is a girl (yes=1) 0.053 0.054
(0.078) (0.077)
housemaid (yes=1) 0.618 0.631 0.734 0.733
(0.182) (0.181) (0.241) (0.241)
father's schooling 0.039 0.040 -0.026 -0.022
(0.014) (0.014) (0.046) (0.047)
mother's schooling -0.061 -0.060 -0.237 -0.236
(0.015) (0.015) (0.155) (0.155)
household expenditure 0.243 0.244 0.030 0.030
(0.049) (0.049) (0.026) (0.026)
urban (yes=1) 0.251 0.222 0.257 0.282
(0.237) (0.228) (0.306) (0.300)
Constant 1.260 1.244 3.391 3.368
(0.351) (0.348) (0.750) (0.757)
Child age Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1864 1864 1864 1864
R-sq 0.518 0.522 0.636 0.636
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The two IVs presented in column 2 and 4 are jointly signicant at 5% level.
Proportion of boys and support variables in the table respectively denote the pro-
portion of boys in the family and a binary indicator for whether a family received
support on family planning.
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the coecient estimate of the proportion of boys remains the same whether I
control for family planning use or not. Thus, the predicted residuals from the xed
eect regression which include proportion of boys as the only excluded instrument
(column 3 of Table 1.3) are saved and used as additional control variable in the
second stage regressions in Section 1.6.
1.5.3 Validity of the Instrument
Are Boys Better O?
One important feature of an instrumental variable is that it should not aect
the dependent variable, except indirectly through the endogenous variable it is
supposed to instrument. Thus, it is important to assess if the proportion of boys in
the household (the instrumental variable) directly aects participation in child labor
and/or school attendance (the dependant variables). This assessment is crucial, but
it is impossible to empirically test whether the correlation exists as it involves the
error term in the second stage equation.
Table 1.4 presents a simple check whether school attendance and/or
participation in child labor systematically varies for boys by the number of sisters
they have. If, say, boys who live with more sisters are more likely to attend school
than those who live with fewer sisters, then we expect boys who live with more
sisters to have a higher probability of school attendance, an indication of direct
relationship between proportion of boys and school attendance. Table 1.4, however,
suggests this is not the case in our data. In fact, it depicts that boys who live with
more sisters are less likely to attend school (upper panel of Table 1.4) and more
likely to work (lower panel of Table 1.4). However, the dierences are not
statistically signicant.
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Table 1.4: Fraction of Boys Who Attend School and Work by Number of Sisters
Mean SD N p-value
School
HHs with more daughters 0.806 0.396 506
HHs with fewer daughters 0.824 0.381 721
Mean Dierence -0.018 0.435
Work
HHs with more daughters 0.903 0.296 506
HHs with fewer daughters 0.875 0.331 720
Mean Dierence 0.028 0.126
Is there Sex Selective Abortion?
If parents selectively abort female fetuses, then the proportion of boys in the
household is endogenous, and hence not a valid instrument. However, sex
determining technologies of fetuses such as ultrasound are not widely used in
Ethiopia to cause a serious concern, but a simple check on birth space is conducted
to see if there is sex selective abortion in the data. If parents selectively abort female
fetuses, the birth space is expected to be higher for families with higher proportion
of boys since the higher proportion of boys is partly driven by sex selective abortion.
Table 1.5 compares birth space between consecutive children by proportion
of boys in the household. The table depicts that the average birth space is about 38
months regardless of the sex composition in the household, implying sex selective
abortion is not a serious concern in the data to make proportion of boys in the
household an invalid instrument.
Table 1.5: Birth Space (in months) by Proportion of Boys in the Household
Proportion of boys in the household
Less than half At least half Mean Dierence
Mean 37.88 37.79 0.0898
Std. Err. 0.750 0.525
No. of Obs. 1305 1832
p-value 0.922
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Is there Dierential Mortality Rate Across Gender?
If infant (less than 1 year old) and child (less than 5 years old) mortality
rates are random across gender, then they do not aect the relationship between the
proportion of boys and the number of kids in the household. However, if they
systematically vary across gender, the observed gender mix in the household not
only reects parents deliberate eort to achieve their desired gender mix but also
the dierential mortality rates across gender.
Since information on mortality rates is not recorded in the data, the presence
of dierential mortality rates (or their absence) cannot be empirically tested. If
mortality rates are not random, then results should be interpreted carefully.
However, remember that xed eect model is estimated in the rst stage regression.
Thus, even if mortality rates are non-random, they do not render our IV invalid as
long as they remain constant between the two survey years, i.e., 2006 and 2009.
1.6 Results
Dierent models are estimated to investigate the eect of birth order on the
probabilities of school attendance and child labor, and the summary of the birth
order estimates are presented in Table 1.6. The estimated models vary depending on
whether it is assumed school attendance and child labor decisions are made jointly
or independently (probit versus bivariate probit models), household heterogeneity is
accounted for (pooled versus unobserved or random eect models), and endogeneity
of family size is addressed (IV models versus the rest of the models). Since it is
reasonable to assume that school attendance and child labor decisions are made
jointly,16 I primarily focus on discussing the results from bivariate probit models
which are reported in the lower half of Table 1.6. The regression outputs for models
16 Note that the coecient estimate of  in the bivariate probit model reported in Table A.7 in
Appendix A.2 is signicant at 1% level, implying bivariate probit model is a better t than univariate
independent probit models.
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reported in the last two rows of Table 1.6 are presented in Table 1.7, whereas that
of the other models reported in Table 1.6 are presented in Appendix A.2.
Table 1.6: Summary of Estimates of Coecient and Average Marginal Eect of Birth Order
from Dierent Models
School Work
Independent Probit Models
Pooled Probit Coef. -0.028 -0.186
p-value (0.552) (0.000)
AME -0.004 -0.037
LL -455 -667
Unobserved Eect Probit Coef. -0.032 -0.193
p-value (0.610) (0.000)
AME -0.003 -0.036
LL -449 -666
Unobserved Eect Probit IV Coef. 0.389 -0.242
p-value (0.040) (0.013)
AME 0.012 -0.020
LL -663 -1146
Bivariate Probit Models
Pooled Bivariate Probit Coef. -0.030 -0.188
p-value (0.520) (0.000)
AME -0.004 -0.038
LL -1119 {
Unobserved Eect Bivariate Probit Coef. -0.026 -0.252
p-value (0.672) (0.000)
AME -0.002 -0.049
LL -1168 {
Unobserved Eect Bivariate Probit IV Coef. 0.151 -0.253
p-value (0.124) (0.000)
AME 0.014 -0.049
LL -1167 {
Note: AME denotes the estimated average marginal eect of birth order on the probabilities
of school attendance and child labor, while LL represents the log likelihood.
The birth order estimates in child labor equations are uniformly negative and
signicant across models (see Table 1.6), though their magnitudes dier. The
coecient estimates are particularly similar in unobserved eect bivariate probit
and unobserved eect bivariate probit IV models (the last two models reported in
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Table 1.6), suggesting that endogeneity of family size is not a serious concern in
estimating child labor equation. This is also implied by the insignicant coecient
estimate of the rst stage residual in the unobserved eect bivariate probit IV
regression which is reported in Table 1.7.
In my preferred model which assumes school attendance and child labor
decisions are made jointly and which accounts for endogeneity of family size (i.e.,
unobserved eect bivariate probit IV model), the average marginal eect of birth
order on the probability of child labor is -0.049. This suggests that a one unit
increase in the birth order of the child, on average, decreases the probability of
participation in child labor by about 5 percentage point. The nding that later-born
(i.e., younger) children are less likely to participate in child labor than their
earlier-born siblings is consistent with prior ndings in the literature (see, for
example, Emerson & Souza, 2008; Edmonds, 2006).
Even if the results discussed above suggest the presence of a negative and
signicant birth order eect on the probability of participation in child labor, it is
important to assess the distribution of the marginal eect since marginal eect is
not constant in non-linear models. Figure 1.2, therefore, presents the distribution of
the estimated marginal eect of birth order on the probability of child labor
participation. As can be seen from the gure, the probabilities are always
non-positive, ranging from -10% to 0; besides, it has a bimodal distribution with
spikes around -10% and 0. This suggests that there may be dierential birth order
eect on the probability of child labor participation across dierent groups of the
population.
Contrary to the fact that the birth order estimates are uniformly negative
and signicant across models in child labor regressions, its estimates in the school
attendance regressions dier both in magnitude and signicance across models.
Generally, it is negative and insignicant in models which do not control for
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Table 1.7: Unobserved Eect Bivariate Probit Estimates of School Attendance and Child
Labor Equations
Bivariate Probit Model Bivariate Probit IV Model
Coef. AME SE Coef. AME SE
School Attendance:
birth order -0.026 [-0.002] (0.06) 0.151 [0.014] (0.10)
number of kids -0.036 [-0.003] (0.05) -0.205 [-0.019] (0.09)
Child's age = 8 0.742 [0.068] (0.24) 0.768 [0.070] (0.24)
Child's age = 9 1.501 [0.138] (0.28) 1.447 [0.132] (0.28)
Child's age = 10 1.550 [0.143] (0.28) 1.508 [0.138] (0.28)
Child's age = 11 2.519 [0.232] (0.35) 2.514 [0.230] (0.35)
Child's age = 12 2.090 [0.193] (0.31) 2.018 [0.185] (0.31)
Child's age = 13 1.739 [0.160] (0.42) 1.658 [0.152] (0.42)
Child's age = 14 2.215 [0.204] (0.41) 2.180 [0.200] (0.41)
Child's age = 15 1.706 [0.157] (0.37) 1.589 [0.145] (0.37)
child is a girl 0.140 [0.013] (0.13) 0.206 [0.019] (0.13)
father's schooling 0.066 [0.006] (0.03) 0.059 [0.005] (0.03)
mother's schooling -0.026 [-0.002] (0.03) -0.068 [-0.006] (0.04)
annual expenditure 0.034 [0.003] (0.12) 0.022 [0.002] (0.12)
urban (yes=1) 1.658 [0.153] (0.41) 1.781 [0.163] (0.43)
1st stage residual 0.191 [0.018] (0.10)
Child Labor:
birth order -0.252 [-0.049] (0.05) -0.253 [-0.049] (0.07)
number of kids 0.151 [0.029] (0.04) 0.151 [0.029] (0.06)
Child's age = 8 0.471 [0.091] (0.21) 0.473 [0.092] (0.21)
Child's age = 9 0.629 [0.122] (0.22) 0.634 [0.123] (0.22)
Child's age = 10 0.588 [0.114] (0.22) 0.596 [0.115] (0.22)
Child's age = 11 0.862 [0.167] (0.20) 0.870 [0.169] (0.20)
Child's age = 12 0.903 [0.175] (0.20) 0.917 [0.178] (0.20)
Child's age = 13 0.837 [0.162] (0.31) 0.852 [0.165] (0.31)
Child's age = 14 0.814 [0.158] (0.26) 0.833 [0.161] (0.26)
Child's age = 15 0.679 [0.131] (0.26) 0.700 [0.136] (0.26)
child is a girl 0.176 [0.034] (0.09) 0.172 [0.033] (0.09)
father's schooling -0.021 [-0.004] (0.02) -0.020 [-0.004] (0.02)
mother's schooling -0.003 [-0.000] (0.02) -0.000 [-0.000] (0.02)
annual expenditure -0.042 [-0.008] (0.05) -0.040 [-0.008] (0.05)
urban (yes=1) -0.703 [-0.136] (0.24) -0.706 [-0.137] (0.24)
1st stage residual -0.010 [-0.002] (0.06)
Observations 1862 1860
Log likelihood -1168.373 -1167.288
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Average marginal eects [AME] and standard errors (SE) are reported in brackets and
parentheses, respectively. Village dummies, a year dummy, and a dummy variable for the
presence of housemaid are included as additional control variables.
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Figure 1.2: Histogram and Kernel Density Estimates of Marginal Eects of Birth Order on
Child Labor
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endogeneity of family size. Once endogeneity of family size is controlled for in the IV
models, the birth order coecient has become positive and signicant in unobserved
eect probit IV model, with estimated average marginal eect of 0.012, implying
younger kids are 1.2 percentage point more likely to attend school than their older
siblings. However, in my preferred model, unobserved eect bivariate probit IV
model, the birth order estimate is positive but not signicant (p  value = 0:124).
As Table 1.7 depicts the average marginal eects of birth order on school
attendance are 0.014 and -0.002 in the IV and non-IV models, respectively; besides,
the coecient estimate of the rst stage residual in the (school attendance) IV
regression is signicant. This suggests that endogeneity of family size is an issue in
the school attendance equation. Hence, the same set of unobservables that aect
parents' choice of family size seem to aect parents' decision whether to send the
child to school. For example, parents who have strong taste for education and care
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more for their children's education may decide to have fewer kids and send them to
school regardless of the birth order of the child.
Though my preferred model implies that there is no birth order eect in the
probability of school attendance, the estimated marginal eect of birth order on the
probability of school attendance is always non-negative for each child, ranging from
0 to 6 percentage point (see Figure 1.3 for the distribution of the estimated
marginal eect). Remember that only about 10% of children in the sample do not
attend school, and this might have contributed in making the coecient estimate of
birth order in school attendance equation insignicant.
Figure 1.3: Histogram and Kernel Density Estimates of Marginal Eects of Birth Order on
School Attendance
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Note that it is possible for birth order to aect the school performance of
children who are going to school even if it does not aect the probability of school
attendance. Cavalieri (2002), for instance, has shown that child labor negatively
aects school performance. If this is true in our data too, we expect high birth order
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(i.e., younger) children to outperform their low birth order siblings in school since
the former are less likely to participate in child labor.
If school performance measures such as test scores are observed in the data,
we can check if the data supports this argument by regressing the school
performance measure on birth order and a host of control variables. Unfortunately,
however, students' test score or other relevant school performance measures are not
recorded in the data. But, information on the child's current grade and his or her
age are available in the data; thus, I could have used age adjusted grade to measure
school performance as used in prior studies (see, for example, Horowitz & Souza,
2011). The problem of using this measure in our data is that school starting age is
not observable, and given most children in developing countries delay primary
school enrollment by few years beyond the legal school starting age (Barro & Lee,
2000), using age adjusted grade would create an additional problem of
identication; namely, identifying the separate eects of birth order and delayed
primary school enrollment on years of schooling. Thus, I resort to assessing if birth
order aects the number of hours the child spends studying. It is inaccurate to
argue that hours spent studying is directly translated to better school performance
since study time is only one of the inputs that aect performance at school.
However, it is plausible to assume that the hours spent studying help students
understand the subjects better and perform well in school, other things being equal.
A xed eect model of the eect of birth order on hours students spend
studying is estimated, and the results are reported in Table 1.8.17 Column 1 of
Table 1.8, which is estimated by restricting the sample to all children who are going
to school, suggests that there is no birth order eect on the number of hours
students spend studying. The same is true for a sample of children who are going to
school but working as child laborer (see column 2 of Table 1.8). But, when I restrict
17 See Figure A.1 in Appendix A.3 for unadjusted relationship between birth order and the time
spent in school and working.
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the sample further to children who are going to school but not working as child
laborer (column 3 of Table 1.8), the coecient estimate of birth order is positive
and signicant suggesting that a one unit increase in birth order increases hours the
child spends studying by 1.9 hours per day.
Table 1.8: Linear Fixed Eect Estimates of Hours Students Spend Studying
All Students Working
Students
Non-working
Students
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
birth order 0.750 (0.62) 0.217 (1.01) 1.946 (1.11)
number of kids -0.709 (0.60) -0.263 (0.99) -1.537 (1.05)
Child's age = 8 0.669 (0.69) -1.306 (0.21) 1.716 (0.85)
Child's age = 9 0.811 (0.79) -0.942 (0.40) 1.805 (1.34)
Child's age = 10 0.858 (0.84) -0.824 (0.56) 0.376 (1.30)
Child's age = 11 1.859 (1.42) -1.756 (0.57) 2.130 (1.91)
Child's age = 12 1.832 (1.53) -1.436 (0.79) 1.905 (2.45)
Child's age = 13 1.727 (1.65) -1.459 (1.09) 0.631 (2.63)
Child's age = 14 2.701 (2.20) -2.498 (1.13) 2.690 (3.10)
Child's age = 15 2.851 (2.32) -1.885 (1.35) 2.275 (3.63)
housemaid (yes=1) 0.919 (0.50) 0.499 (0.78) 1.561 (1.13)
father's schooling -0.089 (0.10) -0.117 (0.10)
mother's schooling -0.383 (0.25) -0.018 (0.38) -0.551 (0.59)
household expenditure 0.059 (0.04) 0.097 (0.08) 0.138 (0.07)
urban (yes=1) -0.590 (0.76) -0.994 (0.28) 0.223 (0.66)
1st stage residual 0.650 (0.60) 0.305 (0.99) 1.275 (1.03)
working child (yes=1) -0.134 (0.10)
Constant 2.657 (1.98) 3.635 (2.22) 2.543 (3.74)
Observations 1670 1305 365
R-sq 0.052 0.068 0.305
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Standard errors (SE) are reported in parentheses. Village and year dummies are included
as additional control variables.
The positive relationship found here between birth order and hours spent
studying is consistent with the nding that child labor negatively aects school
performance (Cavalieri, 2002) since high birth order children are less likely to work.
Though their result and the one found here are not directly comparable, it is
interesting to note that Ejrnaes & Prtner (2004) nd out that rst-borns spend 10
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more hours in school per week than last-borns. The presence of birth order eect
(on study hours) only among children who are going to school but not working as
child laborer indicates that child labor crowds out study hours.
Finally, note that 8 child age dummies (with 7 years as excluded group) are
included to control for the age of the child; hence, it is not age dierence that is
driving the results. The coecient estimates of all the 8 child age dummies are
positive and signicant in both equations (see Table 1.7). Besides, their magnitude
increases somehow progressively with age, suggesting the probability that the child
attends school and works increases with age. The other control variables, in general,
have the expected signs. Children who live in urban areas are more likely to attend
school and less likely to work than their rural counterparts. Compared to boys, girls
are more likely to work, but there is no dierence in the probability of school
attendance by gender. Parental years of schooling have no eect on participation in
child labor, but father's schooling increases the probability of school attendance.
Mother's schooling, nevertheless, has negative eect on school attendance, which is
not consistent with what we expect. Household expenditure, a proxy to the family's
permanent income, plays no role in school attendance and participation in child
labor. This may be because I controlled for father's and mother's years of schooling,
which are proxies for the socioeconomic status of the household.
1.7 Conclusion
It is well known to economists that parental action creates education
inequalities among children (Becker & Tomes, 1976). The role parental action plays
in creating education inequalities is more pronounced in developing countries where
parents are too poor to send all their children to school at the same time and when
child labor is widely practiced. It is not uncommon for poor parents in developing
countries to send some of their children to school and the others to work. Parents
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consider child characteristics and a whole lot of other factors when they allocate the
child's time between child labor obligations and school opportunities. In this essay, I
investigate the role the birth order of the child plays whether the child attends
school or participates in child labor.
One of the methodological challenges in birth order studies is endogeneity of
family size. Endogeneity of family size arises in birth order studies since high birth
order children are observed only in larger families, and parents who choose to have
more kids may be inherently dierent and children in these families would have
worse outcome regardless of family size and birth order. I exploit the fact that
Ethiopian parents prefer boys to girls and use proportion of boys in the family to
instrument family size and estimated unobserved eect bivariate probit IV model of
school attendance and child labor choices using longitudinal household survey data
from Ethiopia.
The results reveal that an increase in birth order by one unit decreases the
probability of child labor participation by 5 percentage point, but I nd no evidence
that suggests birth order aects the probability of school attendance. However,
among children who are going to school, a one unit increase in birth order increases
the time the child spends studying by 1.9 hours per day. Since 8 child age dummies
are included to control for the age of the child, it is not age dierence that is driving
the results. The results obtained here can be generalized to other developing
countries which have similar socio-economic environments as that of Ethiopia, i.e.,
high incidence of child labor, limited access to school, and strong preference for boys.
The birth order eects documented here have important policy implications
for inequalities in education and income. Given dierences in the probability of
child labor participation and hours spent studying across dierent birth order
children, birth order eects tend to work against programs that reduce inequalities
in education and income. For example, in developing countries, where child labor is
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widely practiced and access to school is limited, school expansion may increase the
overall level of education. While increasing education levels, child labor may
exacerbate inequality in education within households if parents, based on birth
order, increase schooling for some of their children while relegating others to child
labor. Programs that aim to increase household income among resource-constrained
households through income transfers or other means may mitigate siblings'
educational inequality.
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II. THE EFFECT OF ACCESS TO PRIMARY SCHOOL ON THE
TIMING OF SCHOOL ENROLLMENT: ANALYSIS OF THE
ETHIOPIAN EDUCATION REFORM
2.1 Introduction
One of the main features of the education system in developing countries is
that the majority of students enroll in primary school long after the legal enrollment
age, which is usually around 6 or 7 years. Barro & Lee (2001) nd out that at least
50% of the students enrolled in grade 1 in 31 countries are older than the legal
enrollment age. In Ethiopia, a country where the data for this study come from, the
2004 Welfare Monitoring Survey data show that more than 80% of children in rural
areas enrolled in grade 1 after the legal enrollment age of 7. A number of other
studies documented the presence of delayed primary school enrollment throughout
the developing world (Bommier & Lambert, 2000; Glewwe & Jacoby, 1995; Wils,
2004; Moyi, 2010; Todd & Winters, 2011).
The standard human capital investment models fail to explain the widely
observed delayed primary school enrollment as they predict that an individual
invests in education in the early period of his/her life, and reaps its benets later in
life. Besides, in communities where child labor is a common practice and most of
the work children are expected to perform are physically demanding, it is optimal
for parents to enroll the child as early as possible since the value of the child's time
is lower when the child is younger. There are evidences that suggest delaying
primary school enrollment is costly. In Ghana, for example, Glewwe & Jacoby
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(1995) calculated that delaying primary school enrollment by 2 years beyond 6
years, the legal enrollment age, costs an individual about 6% of his/her life time
wealth. Also, children who enroll in school late have higher grade repetition and
school dropout rates, and complete fewer years of schooling than those who enroll at
the legal enrollment age (Wils, 2004). Given the high cost associated with delaying
primary school enrollment, it is not well understood why most parents in developing
countries enroll their children long after the prescribed age.
The bulk of the literature in this area focuses on the probability of
enrollment, without considering age at enrollment. However, delayed enrollment
cannot be tackled by general policies that are designed to increase enrollment rates
since delayed enrollment is not conned to countries that have lower enrollment
rates (Moyi, 2010; Lloyd & Blanc, 1996). Very few studies analyzed why students in
developing countries delay primary school enrollment. Loosely speaking, the
explanations these studies provided can be grouped into three: poor child health,
liquidity constraint, and limited (or lack of) access to school.
Poor child health slows down the child's development process and renders
the child less ready to attend school at the legal enrollment age. Hence, at legal
enrollment age, say, a malnourished child would be too weak to be able to walk the
(typically longer) distance to school (Bommier & Lambert, 2000; Partnership, 1999).
Besides, poor child health lowers the learning ability of the child and thus it is
optimal to delay enrollment until the negative eect of poor child health on mental
readiness decreases after a few years when the child gets older (Glewwe & Jacoby,
1995). A liquidity constraint explanation, on the other hand, suggests that resource
constrained families might need to employ the child in family activities until the
family accumulates sucient saving to nance the child's schooling (Jacoby, 1994).
Finally, if there is limited access to schooling, school ocials may ration enrollment
in primary school, and the rationing tends to favor older children who are typically
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on the waiting line for a relatively longer time (Bommier & Lambert, 2000). Note
that shortage of schools means schools are widely dispersed and we expect children
to walk for a relatively longer distance. Since malnourished children are too weak to
walk for longer distance to school, school shortage may interact with child health
and have dierential impact across children on the health distribution.
Most families in developing countries, particularly those in rural areas, do
not have access to primary schools. In recent years, however, many developing
countries have made primary schools more accessible. There are evidences that
suggest making schools more accessible has increased primary school enrollment,
but we know little about the eect of access to school on the timing of enrollment.
This essay, thus, attempts to bridge this gap in the literature by oering empirical
evidence on the eect of access to school on the timing of primary school enrollment
using a household survey data from Ethiopia.
One of the empirical challenges of assessing the eect of access to school on
the timing of enrollment is endogeneity of access to school; that is, families that live
closer to school may be inherently dierent and their children may enroll in school
on time regardless of their proximity to school. In situations like these, most
researchers attempt to mitigate the bias by either nding appropriate instrumental
variable or using a \natural experiment" that aects the endogenous variable but
not the outcome variable. Some prior studies exploit government programs as
exogenous source of variation in economic variables. For example, Todd & Winters
(2011) and McEwan (2013), respectively, exploit the government programs in
Mexico (called Oportunidades) and Chile as exogenous source of variation in child
health to investigate the eect of child health on the timing of school enrollment.
This study employs a similar approach and uses an education policy shock that
happened in Ethiopia between the mid 1990s and mid 2000s as exogenous source of
variation in access to primary school.
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The Ethiopian government has launched a series of ve-year Education Sector
Development Programs (ESDPs) since 1997 with a prime objective of achieving
universal primary education by 2015. To date, 4 ve-year ESDPs have been
implemented. During the rst two ESDPs that covered 8 academic years between
1997/98 and 2004/05, 2,398 new primary schools were built (World Bank, 2005).
The program has substantially decreased distance to primary school at a national
level from its average of 2.73 Km in 1996 to that of 1.25 Km in 2004. Though such
a large number of primary schools were built in a short period of time and the
program has substantially decreased distance to primary school at a national level,
the decrease in distance to primary school vary widely across states and zones1. For
example, distance to primary school has decreased by a 100% in East Wellega zone
while the decrease was only 2.81% in South Gondar zone during the same period.
I exploit the variation in the intensity of the impact of the program across
states to identify the causal eect of access to primary school on the probability of
enrollment in grade 1 by age 7, the legal enrollment age. Narrowing down education
inequalities across states by building more schools in rural and under-served areas
was at the core of the program's objective. In fact, the program explicitly targeted
increasing primary school enrollment from its 30% national average at the beginning
of the program to at least 50% by the end of the program. Thus, we should expect
more schools to be built in areas that had lower primary school enrollment rate in
the pre-program period. Accordingly, states that had pre-program primary school
enrollment rate below 30% are assigned into treatment group, whereas those states
above 30% enrollment rate are assigned into control group. Then,
dierence-in-dierences models are estimated where the dependent variable is a
binary indicator for enrollment in grade 1 by age 7. To estimate the models, I use
household survey data - called Welfare Monitoring Survey (WMS) data -
1 Ethiopia is a federal country with three levels of governments: federal, state (or regional), and
local governments. Zones are the lowest level of governments that are equivalent to US counties.
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administered by Ethiopia's Central Statistical Agency during the periods 1996 and
2004. The main advantage of using data sets from these survey rounds is that they
have information on important variables just before the beginning of the program
(i.e., 1996) and around the end of the program (i.e., 2004).
The results from the dierence-in-dierences models reveal that the
education program has increased the probability the child enrolls in grade 1 by age
7 by more than 35%. The results also suggest that the reform has decreased age at
enrollment in grade 1 by about 4 months. These estimates highlight an important
role that access to school plays in inducing parents to enroll their kids in primary
school at the legal enrollment age.
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. The following section
briey reviews the literature, and Section 2.3 describes the education reform in
Ethiopia. Section 2.4 explains the data used in this essay and presents descriptive
statistics. The impact of the education program on both access to school and
primary school enrollment is discussed in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 presents the
evidence on the impact of the education program on the timing of enrollment. While
doing so, this section discusses the conceptual framework and the identication
strategy, and nally it presents the econometric results. The last section concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
Delayed primary school enrollment is observed in a number of developing
countries. For instance, it has been documented in most Sub-Saharan African
countries (Barro & Lee, 2001), in Tanzania (Bommier & Lambert, 2000), in Ghana
(Glewwe & Jacoby, 1995), in Mozambique (Wils, 2004), in Malawi (Moyi, 2010), and
in Mexico (Todd & Winters, 2011). Contrary to the fact that delayed enrollment is
common in most developing countries, there are limited studies on the topic.
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These prior studies on the topic suggest a number of explanation why parents
delay their children's enrollment in primary school. To mention few of them, rst,
malnutrition could cause delayed primary school enrollment. This is because
malnutrition lowers children's learning ability and hence it is optimal to delay
enrollment until the negative eect of malnutrition decreases after a few years when
the child gets older (Glewwe & Jacoby, 1995). Using a policy intervention that
improved child health in Mexico as exogenous source of variation in child health,
Todd & Winters (2011) nd out that early health and nutrition intervention has
increased the probability a child enrolls on time in primary school. On the contrary,
McEwan (2013) nds out that a similar policy intervention that made higher calorie
meal available to vulnerable children in Chile has no eect on enrollment in grade 1
at the legal enrollment age. The author suggests this could be because the incidence
of child malnutrition is lower in Chile, and most children in Chile enroll in school on
time. On the other hand, in Ghana and Tanzania, Partnership (1999) found out
that malnutrition, measured by height-for-age, delays enrollment in primary school.
Second, De Vreyer et al. (1999) models a household behaviour where
households diversify their investment among three assets: physical assets, general
human capital acquired through schooling, and specic human capital acquired
through child labor. If the return to specic human capital at younger age is higher
than that of general human capital, then parents do not send their children to
school at the legal school enrollment age.
Third, delayed school enrollment could be the result of liquidity constraints.
When households are resource constrained, a child might need to be employed in
family activities until the family accumulates sucient saving to nance the child's
schooling (Jacoby, 1994).
Finally, delayed school enrollment could be the result of supply side
problems. If there is shortage of school, school ocials may ration enrollment in
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primary school, and the rationing tends to favor older children who are typically on
the waiting line for a relatively longer time. On the other hand, shortage of school
may mean students have to walk longer distance to school. In this case, delayed
enrollment could be due to the fact that children may not be mature enough to
walk the distance to school at the legal enrollment age (Bommier & Lambert, 2000).
In societies where there is high incidence of child malnutrition, shortage of schools
exacerbates the problem of delayed enrollment since developmentally stunted
children take relatively longer time to be physically strong and be able to walk the
longer distance to school. On the other hand, walking longer distance to school
increases the propensity that a child walks through unsafe neighborhoods. Thus,
parents that are concerned about the safety of their children may refrain from
sending their children, especially their daughters, to school at the legal enrollment
age.
Though access to school is one of the most important factors that determine
the timing of enrollment, identifying its eect on the timing of enrollment is
complicated by the relationship between school proximity, socioeconomic status,
parental taste for education, and other characteristics that aect the timing of
enrollment. For instance, being economically disadvantaged is correlated with poor
taste for education and living further away from schools. All these factors aect the
timing of enrollment, but they cannot be perfectly controlled in the regression
framework. A credible identication of the eect of access to school on the timing of
enrollment, thus, requires exogenous source of variation in access to school that does
not aect the timing of enrollment.
In situations like these, government programs can be used as exogenous
source of variation in the independent variable. For example, to test the hypothesis
that malnutrition delays school enrollment, Todd & Winters (2011) used the
government program in Mexico called Oportunidades as exogenous source of
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variation in child health. McEwan (2013) also used a similar intervention in Chile as
exogenous source in the amount of calorie intake among children to identify the
causal eect of child health on the timing of enrollment. I follow a similar approach
and use the education reform that happened in Ethiopia between 1996 and 2004 as
exogenous source of variation in proximity to school to identify the causal eect of
access to primary school on the timing of enrollment.
2.3 The Education Reform in Ethiopia
Following the change in government in May 1991, Ethiopia has undergone a
number of policy changes almost in each sectors of the economy. The education
sector is one of the sectors that has gained the attention of the government since
then. Consequently, it has undergone many policy changes and received a large and
increasing budget share of the government. Among the many changes the sector
experienced recently, the implementation of a series of ve-year Education Sector
Development Programs (ESDPs) is the major one. I exploit the variation in the
intensity of the impact of the education program across districts to identify the
causal eect of access to primary school on the timing of enrollment in grade 1.
The ESDPs started in 1997 with the objective of achieving universal primary
education by 2015. Reducing educational inequalities by increasing access to
primary school, mainly in rural and under-served areas, was at the core of the
ESDPs. To date, 4 ve-year ESDPs have been implemented. I will focus on the rst
two ESDPs in this essay as their duration align with the survey years of the data
used in this essay.
The rst ESDP covered ve academic years between 1997/98 and 2001/02.
Over the ve years period of the rst ESDP, it was planned to build 2,423 new
primary schools, to upgrade 1,814 primary schools, and to renovate 1,220 primary
schools in order to accommodate 3.9 million additional students (World Bank,
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1998). The expected outcomes were substantial increase in access to primary school
specially in rural areas where the majority of newly built schools were to be located.
Moreover, it was expected to increase gross primary school enrollment rate from its
30% level by the beginning of the rst ESDP to 50% by the end of the rst ESDP.
The second ESDP also covered ve academic years between 2000/01 to
2004/05. Note that the rst two years of the second ESDP overlapped with the last
two years of the rst ESDP. Thus, in eect, the second ESDP had covered three
unique academic years between 2002/03 and 2004/05. The reason for the overlap in
the duration of the rst and second ESDPs is to align the second and consecutive
(i.e., third and fourth) ESDPs with the political election cycle and the ve year
term of the elected government in oce. Though it was planned to built 2,423
primary schools during the rst ESDP alone, a total of 2,398 new primary schools
were built during the rst two ESDPs, and, in line with the focus of the program,
86% of the new schools were built in rural areas (World Bank, 2005).
As the rst two ESDPs covered 8 academic years between 1997/98 and
2004/05, household survey data collected in 1996 and 2004 are used in this essay so
that the 1996 and 2004 data are, respectively, used as pre and post program data.
The following section briey discusses the data used in this essay and presents
descriptive statistics.
2.4 Data
The analysis in this essay is based on household survey data called Welfare
Monitoring Survey (WMS) data, which was administered by Ethiopia's Central
Statistical Agency during the periods 1996 and 2004. The WMS is a cluster-based
nationally representative repeated cross section household survey. The 1996 and
2004 WMS covered 11,569 and 36,303 households, respectively, and the surveys
contain a wide range of information on household demographics, household assets,
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availability and use of dierent facilities (including schools), and other important
economic variables.
For each household member aged ve and above, I observe whether an
individual was attending school during the survey years and a year prior to the
survey years. I also observe the grade in which an individual was registered in these
two consecutive years. Using this information, I restricted the sample to rst time
grade 1 enrollees in the two survey years. Since grade repetition is common in
Ethiopia as it is in most developing countries, it is important to mention that one of
the advantages of these data is that they allow us to observe rst time grade 1
enrollees. Hence, bias from measurement error of age at enrollment - that can be
caused by grade repetition - is not a serious concern here.
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for a sample of children used in the
econometric analysis.2 The table shows that children in rural areas, on average,
enroll in grade 1 at least 2.5 years after the legal enrollment age of 7. The extent of
delayed enrollment in rural area is also reected by the small proportion of children
that were enrolled in grade 1 by age 7, which was 11% in 1996 and 18% in 2004.
Similarly, a non trivial number of children in urban areas enroll in grade 1 after the
legal enrollment age though delayed enrollment in urban areas is not as common as
it is in rural areas. For instance, Table 2.1 depicts that only 50% and 53% of
children in urban areas were enrolled in grade 1 by age 7 in 1996 and 2004,
respectively. Moreover, children in urban areas delay enrollment in grade 1 by about
a year in 1996 and 10 months in 2004. To summarize, a sizable proportion of
children enroll in grade 1 few years after the legal enrollment age of 7 years.
However, children in rural areas are more likely to delay enrollment, and when they
do, they delay enrollment by more years than their urban counterparts.
2 See Table ?? in the Appendix for detailed denition of variables used in the econometric analysis.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for a Sample of Children Who Were Enrolled in Grade 1
by Year and Location
1996 2004
Rural Urban Rural Urban
Enrolled in grade 1 by age 7 (yes=1) 0.111 0.498 0.176 0.528
(0.314) (0.501) (0.381) (0.500)
Age at enrollment 10.203 7.967 9.635 7.752
(2.128) (1.760) (2.151) (1.587)
Girl (yes=1) 0.304 0.474 0.452 0.534
(0.461) (0.501) (0.498) (0.500)
Birth order 2.538 3.414 2.509 2.859
(1.334) (1.936) (1.414) (1.646)
Household size 7.184 7.395 7.032 6.662
(1.895) (2.409) (1.896) (2.110)
Dad's years of schooling 1.108 5.107 1.629 5.041
(2.165) (3.687) (2.580) (3.679)
Mom's years of schooling 0.149 3.386 0.570 3.248
(0.768) (3.642) (1.635) (3.756)
Dad's age 45.364 45.558 44.803 43.931
(9.725) (11.411) (10.615) (10.798)
Mom's age 37.038 36.293 35.867 34.614
(7.840) (7.353) (7.809) (7.710)
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hh has piped water (yes=1) 0.044 0.716 0.151 0.783
(0.206) (0.452) (0.358) (0.413)
hh has electricity (yes=1) 0.013 0.847 0.020 0.707
(0.112) (0.361) (0.140) (0.456)
hh has pit latrine (yes=1) 0.092 0.758 0.253 0.741
(0.289) (0.429) (0.435) (0.439)
hh owns land (yes=1) 0.997 0.521 0.993 0.703
(0.056) (0.501) (0.084) (0.458)
hh owns farm animal (yes=1) 0.633 0.107 0.972 0.655
(0.483) (0.310) (0.166) (0.476)
proportion of hhs with piped water 0.035 0.778 0.148 0.819
(0.137) (0.318) (0.286) (0.301)
proportion of hhs with electricity 0.016 0.811 0.020 0.677
(0.087) (0.313) (0.105) (0.361)
proportion of hhs with pit latrine 0.083 0.719 0.229 0.705
(0.204) (0.262) (0.295) (0.267)
proportion of hhs with land 0.974 0.507 0.956 0.547
(0.048) (0.252) (0.072) (0.269)
proportion of hhs with farm animal 0.493 0.058 0.895 0.515
(0.300) (0.138) (0.101) (0.295)
Unemployment rate* 2.479 11.013 3.588 5.109
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(4.743) (14.310) (3.993) (6.068)
Observations 316 215 1547 290
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
*Source: The 1994 and 2007 Ethiopian Census.
Proportion of households is dened over the locality of the child's residence which is roughly
equivalent to a village or an urban neighborhood. The indicator variable for land ownership
(i.e. hh owns land (yes=1)) takes a value of 1 if any member of the household owns any
land holdings regardless of how the land is used, and 0 otherwise.
Note that girls' enrollment rate has been disproportionately lower for a long
time, particularly in rural Ethiopia. Table 2.1, however, shows that the proportion
of girls enrolled in grade 1 has been increasing during the period of analysis, both in
rural and urban areas. Given narrowing down gender gap in primary school
enrollment was one of the objectives of the program, it is interesting to see
increasing proportion of girls was enrolled in grade 1 during this period.
Generally speaking, parents in Ethiopia are less educated, with the highest
average years of schooling being 5 years for fathers and 3 years for mothers. As
expected, parents in urban area are more educated than their rural counterparts.
Parental years of schooling has slightly increased in rural areas between 1996 and
2004. Though it is not clear why this is the case, it could be partly because of
ongoing adult education in Ethiopia.
Household assets and amenities variables depicted in Table 2.1 show that
families in rural areas have fewer household assets and live in poor housing
conditions compared to those in urban areas. However, household assets and
housing condition have improved during the period of analysis for households both
in rural and urban areas. To control for the economic condition of the locality of the
child's residence, I control for the proportion of households that owns dierent types
of household assets and amenities in the locality of the child's residence, i.e.,
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enumeration area which is used as primary sampling unit in the survey design and is
roughly equivalent to a village or an urban neighborhood. As expected, the table
shows that rural localities are relatively poorer than their urban counterparts.
Finally, Table 2.1 depicts that unemployment rate varies by location of residence,
with urban unemployment rate higher than rural unemployment rate.
2.5 The Impact of the Education Program on Access to School and
Primary School Enrollment
The education program substantially increased access to school in Ethiopia.
As mentioned earlier, 2,398 new primary schools were built over a period of 8 years
as a results of the program (World Bank, 2005). Besides, data from the 1996 and
2004 Ethiopian Welfare Monitoring Survey show that the average distance to
primary school had decreased, at a national level, by 1.48 kilometers between 1996
and 2004, which is more than a 100% decrease from its average of 2.73 Km in 1996
to that of 1.25 Km in 2004.
Though the program has substantially decreased distance at a national level,
Figure 2.1 shows that the change in distance to primary school during this period
vary widely across zones. Of the total 52 zones surveyed both in 1996 and 2004,
distance to primary school decreased in 43 zones, ranging from a 100% decrease to
that of 2.81% decrease. On the other hand, distance to primary school increased in
9 zones during the same period, ranging from a 1.13% increase to that of 203%
increase.
Similarly, enrollment in primary school has increased substantially in recent
years. Figure 2.2 depicts the trend in enrollment rate in primary school in the last
three decades using data from the World Bank.3 For the most part of the 1980s,
enrollment rate was stable around 40%, except in the late 1980s where it started to
3 See Table B.4 in Appendix B.1 for the raw data used to generate Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.1: Percentage Change in Distance to Primary School Between 1996 and 2004 by
Zones in Ethiopia
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decline. The decline is mainly because of the aggravated civil war between the
military government in power at that time and the rebellion group that nally
threw the military government out of power in 1991.
Starting the early 1990s, enrollment rate has started to increase and reached
its 1980s level around 1997. Enrollment rate has been continuously increasing since
then. The increase in enrollment rate during the period of analysis (which is marked
between the two vertical lines in Figure 2.2) is attributed to the education program
that has been in place. Remember that even if the focus of this essay is on the
education program that was implemented between 1996 and 2004 (more specically,
the rst and second Education Sector Development Programs), the next phase of
the program (i.e., the third Education Sector Development Program) has been
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implemented by the end of the second phase of the program. Therefore, we should
not expect the growth in enrollment rate to decrease or plateau after 2004. That is
why the curve in Figure 2.2 continuously increases even after 2004.
Figure 2.2: Primary School Enrollment Rate Trend in Ethiopia (Source: World Bank)
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One feature of the education program is narrowing down educational
inequalities across states and between rural and urban residents. This is reected in
the allocation of the newly built schools where 86% of them were built in rural areas
(World Bank, 2005). The program also explicitly targeted increasing primary school
enrollment from its 30% national average at the beginning of the program to at
least 50% by the end of the program. We should, therefore, expect more schools to
be built in states that had less than 30% enrollment rate before the program.
Accordingly, I assign states with less than 30% enrollment rate before the program
in the treated group and those above 30% in the control group.
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Using the 1994 Ethiopian census data, Table 2.2 presents the primary school
enrollment rate before the program by state and treatment status. Three states had
enrollment rate above 30% before the program. These three states are assigned into
a control group and all the remaining states are assigned into a treatment group. It
is crucial to mention that the three states in the control group are largely urban in
nature and leads primarily a non-agrarian economy. But note that all the other
states also have major urban areas4 although the majority of their residents live in
rural areas. Given the program focused on building the majority of the schools in
rural areas, it is expected states in the control group to be predominantly urban in
nature.
Table 2.2: Enrollment Rate in Primary School (Grades 1-8) During the Year Before the
Education Program
State/Region Enrollment Rate Treated State?
Tigray 15.2 Yes
Afar 2.96 Yes
Amhara 7.64 Yes
Oromiya 9.52 Yes
Somali 2.03 Yes
Benishangul Gumuz 9.94 Yes
SNNP 10.9 Yes
Harari 31 No
Addis Ababa 62 No
Dire Dawa 31.6 No
Source: The 1994 Ethiopian Census.
4 Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia denes two types of urban areas: major urban areas and
other urban areas. This classication depends on the nature of economic activity and the number
of residents. All state capitals are considered as major urban areas, and they are typically more
developed and have larger population size relative to other urban areas.
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2.6 The Impact of the Education Program on the Timing of Enrollment
2.6.1 Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework in this essay draws on Glewwe & Jacoby (1995).
Assuming xed school attendance cost, they show that health status aects a child's
readiness to school attendance at the legal enrollment age, and they nd out that
healthier children enroll in school on time. The model presented here follows their
basic structure, but it introduces proximity to school as additional variable cost to
the timing of enrollment in primary school.
Assume the child's life is divided into three periods. The rst period covers
the time between birth and age at enrollment (t0). During this period, the child
works and acquires experience. At t0, parents decide whether to enroll a child in
school. The second period is exclusively allocated to schooling during which the
child attends school for s years and accumulates general human capital. In the nal
period, the child works until retirement year, T . Earnings depend on both the
general human capital accumulated and work experience. In the nal period, thus,
earning depends on years of schooling completed, the experience acquired prior to
schooling and after schooling.
The lifetime income (V ) of the child is given by the sum of earnings before
and after schooling after the cost of schooling is deducted. More precisely,
V =
Z t0
0
w(s; t)e rtdt 
Z t0+s
t0
c(d)e rtdt+
Z T
t0+s
w(s; t)e rtdt: (2.1)
Wage rate is a function of two arguments: years of schooling (the rst
argument) and work experience (the second argument). Years of schooling is zero in
the rst period while it is s in the third period. On the other hand, work experience
is t0 and (t  s  t0) in periods one and three, respectively. Thus, in period one and
three wage rates are given by w(0; t0) and w(s; t  s  t0), respectively. Period two
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is exclusively dedicated to schooling during which the child incurs both direct and
indirect costs. The direct costs include tuition fee, purchase of books, etc, which are
assumed to be xed and excluded from the equation. Opportunity cost of school
attendance is the indirect cost the child incurs while attending school. This can
depend, for example, on distance to school and is denoted by d. Households decide
on t0 (age at school enrollment), i.e.,
max
t0
V:
Assuming separability between the eect of education and work experience
on wage rate, we can write the earning function as:
w(s; t) = f(s)g(t);
where f and g are increasing functions and concave in their arguments. We expect g
to be increasing in its argument since both pre-school experience and readiness to
school increases with t (Glewwe & Jacoby, 1995; Bommier & Lambert, 2000).
With a little bit of manipulation and rearrangement, the equilibrium
condition of the maximization problem gives us:
@t0
@d
> 0: (2.2)
The expression in equation (2.2) suggests that age at enrollment increases with
distance.
2.6.2 Econometric Method
According to the conceptual framework developed in Subsection (2.6.1), age
at enrollment is a function of distance to primary school. Note that t0 in equation
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(2.2) represents age at primary school enrollment. Let us denote enrollment status
of child i in year t by enrollit, and the corresponding parental utility by enroll

it. We
expect parents to enroll the child at the legal age if parental utility from enrolling a
child at the legal age is greater than the alternative choice of not enrolling the child
in school on time, i.e., enrollit = 1 if enroll

it > 0; and 0 otherwise.
Taking into account individual dierences in observable characteristics, the
probability the child enrolls on time is given by:
Pr(enrollit = 1jdit;Xit) = G(dit + Xit); (2.3)
where d denotes distance to primary school and Xit represents a vector of
explanatory variables including a constant. Equation (2.3) is a generic model where
G is a function taking on values strictly between zero and one. For the linear
probability model G is an identity function so that
Pr(enrollit = 1jdit;Xit) = dit + Xit. For the probit model, G is the standard
normal cumulative distribution function.
If access to primary school (dit) is endogenous in equation (2.3), estimates of
equation (2.3) provides biased estimate of  and hence it cannot be interpreted as
the causal eect of access to school on the probability of enrollment on time. There
are a number of reasons why we expect access to primary school to be endogenous
in equation (2.3), including unobserved parental taste for education. Generally,
families that live closer to schools may be inherently dierent and their children
may enroll in school on time regardless of their proximity to school. If there is
exogenous source of variation to proximity to school that does not aect the
outcome variable, the causal eect of access to school on the timing of enrollment
can be identied. I exploit the variation in the intensity of the impact of the
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education program across states in Ethiopia to identify the causal eect of access to
school on the timing of enrollment.
Dierence-in-Dierences Approach
Ideally, I would compare the probability of enrollment in grade 1 by age 7
(enrolli) for the same set of children when they are exposed to the education
program (enrollijeducation program) and when they are not
(enrollijno education program). In this ideal case, the average treatment eect
would be the dierences in the expected values under the two scenarios.
However, the same set of children cannot be observed under both scenarios
since the child is either exposed to the program or not. Hence, to estimate the
average treatment eect, data on two groups of randomly assigned children where
one group is exposed to the program (treatment group) while the other is not
exposed to the program (control group) are required. As long as assignment of
children to treatment (Treated = 1) and control (Treated = 0) groups are random,
the average treatment eect can be obtained by rst dierence model.
If, however, children in the two groups dier initially and have dierent
timing of enrollment in the absence of the program, I have to control for the
pre-existing dierence between the two groups. If I have information on
observations both before the education program occurred (After = 0) and after the
program occurred (After = 1), then a dierence in dierences approach can be used
to separate the pre-existing dierence from that of the treatment eect. Specically,
I can estimate:
Pr(enrollit = 1) = G(0 + 0Treatedit + 0Afterit + 0Treatedit  Afterit) (2.4)
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In linear probability model, 0 in equation (2.4) estimates the pre-existing dierence
between children in the two groups, 0 estimates the change in the outcome that
occurred over time due to other factors, and 0 estimates the impact of the
education program. Estimating 0 in equation (2.4) assumes children in the two
groups would experience the same time trend (0) in the absence of the program, so
that once initial dierence (0) and time trend are controlled for, the remaining
dierence between children in the treatment and control groups can be attributed to
the program.
As mentioned earlier, state level pre-program enrollment rate in primary
school is used to group states (and hence students) into treatment and control
groups. Specically, students that live in states that had pre-program primary
school enrollment rate below 30% are assigned into treatment group, whereas
students that live in states with pre-program primary school enrollment rate above
30% are assigned into control group. The argument is that relatively more schools
should be built in areas where the pre-program enrollment rate in primary school is
lower since the program explicitly targeted narrowing down education inequalities
across states by building more primary schools in areas where primary school
enrollment rate was lower before the education program. Hence, if proximity to
primary school induces children to enroll on time, in the post-program period, we
expect to see children in the treated states to be more likely to enroll in primary
school on time relative to those that live in control states.
The basic identication strategy can easily be demonstrated by a simple
dierence-in-dierences table. Table 2.3 presents the dierence in dierences in age
at enrollment in grade 1 between children in the treated and control states before
and after the education program. The rst column of Table 2.3 displays that, before
the program, children in the treated group enrolled in grade 1 at age 9.5 while those
in the control group enrolled at age 7.9, a dierence of 1.6 years. The dierence,
64
however, narrowed down to 1.2 years after the program. Thus, the dierence in the
dierences in age at enrollment in grade 1 is about  0:4 years (i.e., 1:2  1:6).5
The dierence in dierences can be interpreted as the causal eect of the
program under the assumption that in the absence of the program the decrease in
age at enrollment would not have been systematically dierent in treated and control
states. If this assumption is not satised, the dierence in dierences presented here
cannot be interpreted as the \true" treatment eect. In the paragraphs below, I
present a dierence-in-dierences model that adjusts for observable dierences
between individuals in the treated and control groups in the regression framework.
Table 2.3: Age at Enrollment by Treatment Group Before and After the Program
Before the Change After the Change Time Dierence
Treated Group 9.516 9.271 -0.245
(0.107) (0.051) (0.116)
Untreated Group 7.889 8.078 0.189
(0.198) (0.143) (0.255)
Group Dierence 1.627 1.193 -0.434
(0.266) (0.164)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses
Using observations sampled from 10 states in Ethiopia and controlling for
individual, household, and community-level characteristics; state xed eects; and
state-by-year xed eects to improve precision, I estimate:
Pr(enrollist = 1) = G( + Treateds + Afterit + Treateds  Afterit + 1Xit
+2Wht + 3Ct + 4S+ 5S Y)
(2.5)
5 A counterpart of Table 2.3 which uses means of enrollment dummy is presented in Table B.2
in Appendix B.1. Table B.2 shows that the unadjusted treatment eect is 0.053, suggesting the
program has increased the probability of enrollment in grade 1 by age 7 by 5.3%. Note that the
same result can be obtained from OLS regression of equation (2.4). The results from the OLS
regression are reported in column 1 of Table B.3 in Appendix B.1. As expected, the coecient
estimate of the interaction term (i.e., Treatedit Afterit) is 0.053
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where enrollist is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if child i in state s in
year t is enrolled in grade 1 by age 7; Treateds is a binary indicator for states that
had pre-program primary school enrollment rate below 30%; Afterit is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the child is being observed after the program, and zero
otherwise; Xit, Wht, and Ct are vectors of individual, household, and community
level characteristics, respectively; S is a vector of state dummies to control for (time
invariant) state xed eect; and (S Y) is a vector of binary indicators for the
interaction of state and year dummies to control for state-specic shocks over this
period which are correlated with the education program.6
The primary (explanatory) variable of interest is the interaction term,
Treateds  Afterit, and  captures the treatment eect, i.e., the eect on the
probability a child enrolls in grade 1 by age 7 due to the child lives in the treated
states (relative to those that live in the control states) after the program has
occurred. While estimating equation (2.5), the standard errors are clustered by
enumeration area, a primary sampling unit, to account for correlation in the error
terms within enumeration area over time. For the most part, I assume G is standard
normal cumulative distribution function and estimate a probit model, in which case
the average marginal eect of the interaction term and its standard error are
computed as suggested by Ai & Norton (2003).
2.6.3 Econometric Results
Table 2.4 presents both Linear Probability Model (LPM) and probit
estimates of equation (2.5) where the dependent variable is a binary indicator for
6 A slightly dierent version of the model presented in equation (2.5) is the one that replaces
the dummy variable for treated group, Treateds, by a continuous pre-program state level primary
school enrollment rate variable, EnrolRates, i.e.,
Pr(enrollist = 1) = G(+ EnrolRates + Afterit + EnrolRates Afterit + 1Xit
+2Wht + 3Ct + 4S+ 5S Y)
Results from this specication are presented in column 2 of Table 2.6.
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enrollment in grade 1 by age 7.7 The rst column shows the results from the LPM,
while the second column presents that of the probit model. The probit model
indicates that children in the treated states are 31% less likely to enroll in grade 1
by age 7 relative to children in the control states during the pre-program period,
and the eect is statistically signicant at 2.6 percent level. This evidence supports
the argument that there was pre-existing dierence in the timing of enrollment in
primary school between children in the treated and control states prior to the
education program, where children in the treated states were less likely to enroll in
primary school at the legal enrollment age relative to those in the control states.
The average marginal eect of the interaction term is 0.35 in LMP and 0.36
in probit model. This suggests children in the treated state are 35% and 36% more
likely to enroll on time relative to those who live in the control state after the
program has occurred. Note that the specications control for pre-existing
dierences in the timing of enrollment between children in the treated and control
states; the time trend, i.e., the change in the timing of enrollment overtime due to
other factors; observable individual, household, and community-level characteristics;
state xed eect; and state-by-year xed eect. Hence, this eect is attributed to
the education program, and it can be interpreted as the \true" average treatment
eect.
Even if Table 2.4 documents positive and signicant average treatment eect,
it is crucial to examine the distribution of the treatment eect in non-linear models
such as probit since marginal eect is not constant in non-linear models. Figure 2.3,
hence, presents the histogram and kernel density of the treatment eect. The gure
clearly shows that the treatment eect is always non-negative and goes up well
above 40%, suggesting large and positive treatment eect. The histogram and
kernel density of the treatment eect is also plotted separately for rural and urban
7 To conserve space, Table 2.4 suppresses the coecients of the control variables. See Table B.5
in Appendix B.1 for the full version of the regression output.
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Table 2.4: Dierence-in-Dierences Estimates of the Eect of the Education Reform on On-
time School Enrollment
Dependent Variable: Binary Indicator for Enrollment in Grade 1 by Age 7
(1) (2)
LPM Probit
Treated (yes=1) 0.037 -0.307
(0.120) (0.138)
After (yes=1) -0.208 -0.217
(0.159) (0.135)
Treated*After 0.352 0.364
(0.173) (0.189)
Controls Yes Yes
State xed eects Yes Yes
State-by-year xed eects Yes Yes
Observations 2372 2372
R-sq 0.243
Log Likelihood -1000.591
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Reported coecients are average marginal eects.
Robust standard errors are clustered by enumeration area, the
primary sampling unit, and are reported in parentheses. All re-
gressions control for individual-level characteristics (i.e., a binary
indicator for gender, birth order, mother's and father's age and
years of schooling), household-level characteristics (i.e., household
size, binary indicators for whether a household has piped water,
electricity, pit latrine, land, and farm animal), locality-level char-
acteristics (i.e., proportion of households with piped water, elec-
tricity, pit latrine, land, and farm animal), and location of resi-
dence, i.e., urban dummy.
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samples (see Figures B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B.2) to see if there is any dierence
in the treatment eect between rural and urban samples. The gures show strong
and positive treatment eect both for urban and rural samples.
Figure 2.3: Histogram and Kernel Density of the Treatment Eect
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The Effect of the Education Reform on On−time School Enrollment
Alternative Specications and Robustness Check
Both specications presented in Table 2.4 do not control for family income.
This is because information on family income is not collected in the WMS data.
Fortunately, however, detailed information on family income and expenditure is
gathered in a supplementary survey called Household Income, Consumption, and
Expenditure Survey (HICES), which is also administered by the Ethiopian Central
Statistical Agency. HICES collects information on a subset of households that are
surveyed in WMS, and it is usually conducted in the same year as the WMS. Using
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households sampled both in the HICES and WMS, I re-estimate equation (2.5) both
by including and excluding household expenditure in the regression model.
The rst 3 columns of Table 2.5 present the results from dierent
specications using the restricted sample ( i.e., households observed both in the
HICES and WMS), and hence has relatively smaller sample size. To make
comparison of results from dierent specications (that control for household
expenditure and that do not) straight forward, the basic specication reported in
column 2 of Table 2.4 is re-estimated for the restricted sample, and the results are
presented in column 1 of Table 2.5. Column 2 of Table 2.5 presents the results from
a specication that controls for household expenditure. Controlling for household
expenditure changes neither the magnitude nor the signicance of the average
marginal eect of the interaction term. The coecient estimate of the household
expenditure itself, on the other hand, is positive, but not signicant. It is
insignicant may be because the specication controls for parental years of
schooling and household assets and amenities, which are generally good controls for
families' socioeconomic status.
If higher income families self select themselves to live at closer proximity to
schools and they are more likely to enroll their children in primary school on time
regardless of their proximity to school, then household income or expenditure is
endogenous and bias the results. The program was explicitly designed to make
primary schools more accessible to households in rural areas and underserved
localities. In this setting, bias from this type of selection is less likely since the
program exogenously allocates new schools across households. If higher income
families somehow managed to inuence policy makers to build more schools in their
locality or higher income families move to areas that received more school
construction, then household expenditure is endogenous and biases the results. To
mitigate potential endogeneity of household expenditure, I aggregated household
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expenditure at enumeration area - a primary sampling unit which is typically
equivalent to a village or urban neighborhood - level and estimated equation (2.5).
The results are depicted in column 3 of Table 2.5. The average treatment eect
under this specication is again similar to those presented in columns 1 and 2 both
in magnitude and signicance. The similarity of the results reinforces the argument
that relatively rich communities were less likely to inuence policy makers to build
more schools in their communities. It also suggests there is no evidence that high
income families moved to areas that received more school allocation.
One of the identifying assumptions in the dierence-in-dierences model is
the economic growth rate in the treated and control states do not vary
systematically over time. In reality, however, states in the two groups may
experience dierent growth rates. Thus, the estimates could potentially confound
the eect of the program with the eect of the dierential growth rate on the timing
of enrollment that would have been observed even in the absence of the program.
Thus, I present a specication that controls for state level unemployment rate in
column 5 of Table 2.5. Information on unemployment rate is obtained from the 1994
and 2007 Ethiopian census. In this specication, the average treatment eect has
increased by about 9 percentage point relative to the basic specication. Note that
column 4 of Table 2.5 simply presents the results of the basic specication reported
in column 2 of Table 2.4.
If we expect states with relatively higher growth rate (or lower
unemployment rate) make schools relatively more accessible to their residents in the
absence of the program, and if we assume the program targets building more schools
in states with lower growth rate, then comparison of the average treatment eect in
the basic specication and the one that controls for dierences in economic growth
rate implies that the program help children who live in lower-growth-rate states to
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Table 2.5: Dierence-in-Dierences Estimates of the Eect of the Education Reform on On-
time School Enrollment
Dependent Variable: Binary Indicator for Enrollment in Grade 1 by Age 7
Restricted Sample Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treated (yes=1) -0.333 -0.328 -0.334 -0.307 -0.773
(0.141) (0.140) (0.140) (0.138) (0.413)
After (yes=1) -0.234 -0.235 -0.239 -0.217 -0.242
(0.139) (0.138) (0.139) (0.135) (0.150)
Treated*After 0.399 0.395 0.400 0.364 0.450
(0.158) (0.157) (0.158) (0.189) (0.215)
Log(exp) 0.016
(0.019)
Log(exp, comm.) 0.013
(0.032)
Unempt rate, state -0.021
(0.014)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-by-year xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1439 1439 1439 2372 2368
Log Likelihood -631.692 -631.350 -631.610 -1000.591 -1000.591
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Reported coecients are average marginal eects. Robust standard errors are clustered by
enumeration area, the primary sampling unit, and are reported in parentheses. All regressions
control for individual, household, and locality-level characteristics. The \full sample" contains
households that are observed in WMS data and meet the sample restriction criteria of this
study, while the \restricted sample" contains a subset of households in the \full sample" which
are also observed in a supplementary survey called HICES. See the text for further information.
Log(exp), Log(exp, comm.), and Unempt rate, state denote log of household expenditure,
log of average household expenditure in the community, and state level unemployment rate,
respectively.
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catch up with those in high-growth-rate states in terms of enrolling in primary
school on time.
Finally, column 2 of Table 2.6 presents results from a model that replaces a
binary indicator (for treated states) by a continuous measure of pre-program state
level primary school enrollment rate.8 One advantage of using a continuous primary
school enrollment rate variable, rather than a binary indicator, is it makes use of all
the available information and hence the treatment eect is more precisely estimated.
Besides, it is more robust to the risk of arbitrarily grouping states into treatment
and control groups. Prior studies employ a similar strategy to estimate treatment
eect. For instance, Miller (2012) used pre-reform insurance rate to investigate the
eect of the 2006 Massachusetts health reform on emergency room visits. In this
continuous treatment specication, Treateds in equation (2.5) is replaced by
pre-program state level primary school enrollment rate, EnrolRates.
In this model, the estimate of the average marginal eect of EnrolRates can
be interpreted as the change in the probability of enrollment in grade 1 by age 7 for
a one percent change in the pre-program enrollment rate. I nd that children who
lived in states with one percent higher pre-program primary school enrollment rate
were about 1.9% more likely to enroll in school on time, rearming the pre-existing
dierence on the timing of enrollment across children that live in states with
dierent pre-program primary school enrollment rate. On the other hand, the
average treatment eect is estimated to be -0.021. This treatment eect suggests
that, on average, children that lived in a state with one percent higher pre-program
enrollment rate were 2.1% less likely to enroll in primary school on time. Thus, the
program has caused children that live in states with lower pre-program enrollment
rate to enroll in school on time.
8 Again, column 1 of Table 2.6 presents the results of the basic specication reported in column
2 of Table 2.4 for comparison purpose.
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Table 2.6: Dierence-in-dierences Estimates of the Eect of the Education Reform on On-
time School Enrollment
Dependent Variable: Binary Indicator for Enrollment in Grade 1 by Age 7
(1) (2)
Treated (yes=1) -0.307
(0.138)
After (yes=1) -0.217 0.434
(0.135) (0.193)
Treated*After 0.364
(0.189)
Pre-program primary school enrollment rate 0.019
(0.008)
(Pre-program primary school enrollment rate)*(After) -0.021
(0.009)
Controls Yes Yes
State xed eects Yes Yes
State-by-year xed eects Yes Yes
Observations 2372 2372
Log Likelihood -1000.591 -1000.591
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Reported coecients are average marginal eects.
Robust standard errors are clustered by enumeration area, the primary sampling unit, and
are reported in parentheses. All regressions control for individual-level characteristics (i.e.,
a binary indicator for gender, birth order, mother's and father's age and years of school-
ing), household-level characteristics (i.e., household size, binary indicators for whether a
household has piped water, electricity, pit latrine, land, and farm animal), locality-level
characteristics (i.e., proportion of households with piped water, electricity, pit latrine, land,
and farm animal), and location of residence, i.e., urban dummy.
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By How Much Has the Program Decreased Age at Enrollment?
The results presented above support the argument that the program has
increased the probability of enrollment in grade 1 at the legal enrollment age. It is,
therefore, interesting to investigate by how much the program has decreased age at
enrollment. Table 2.7 presents the estimates of this experiment9 where the
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of age at enrollment. Meyer et al.
(1995) employed a similar approach to investigate the eect of workers'
compensation on time out of work arguing that log duration regression is a special
case of exponential, Weibull, and log-logistic hazard models in the absence of
censoring and time varying explanatory variables.
Again, for the purpose of comparison, the results of the basic specication
reported in column 2 of Table 2.4 is presented in column 1 of Table 2.7. Column 2
of Table 2.7, on the other hand, depicts the results of the log duration regression,
where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of age at enrollment. The
results reported in column 2 of Table 2.7 show that the average treatment eect is
-0.197, implying that the dierence in age at enrollment between children in the
treated and control states has decreased by 19.7% as a result of the education
program. Remember that children in the treated states, on average, enroll in
primary school 1.63 years later than those in the control states before the education
program (see Table 2.3). Hence, the program has decreased age at enrollment in
grade 1 by 3.85 months or 0.32 (1:63  0:197) years.
2.7 Conclusion
In recent years, many governments in developing countries have attempted to
achieve universal primary education through a large scale construction of primary
9 To conserve space, Table 2.7 suppresses the coecients of the control variables. See Table B.6
in Appendix B.1 for the full version of the regression output.
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Table 2.7: Dierence-in-Dierences Estimates of the Eect of the Education Reform on
On-time School Enrollment
(1) (2)
Enrollment Status Log(Age at Enrollment)
Treated (yes=1) -0.307 0.158
(0.138) (0.055)
After (yes=1) -0.217 0.145
(0.135) (0.060)
Treated*After 0.364 -0.197
(0.189) (0.068)
Controls Yes Yes
State xed eects Yes Yes
State-by-year xed eects Yes Yes
Observations 2372 2372
R-sq 0.384
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Robust standard errors are clustered by enumeration area, the primary sampling unit, and are
reported in parentheses. The regression controls for individual-level characteristics (i.e., a binary
indicator for gender, birth order, mother's and father's age and years of schooling), household-
level characteristics (i.e., household size, binary indicators for whether a household has piped
water, electricity, pit latrine, land, and farm animal), locality-level characteristics (i.e., proportion
of households with piped water, electricity, pit latrine, land, and farm animal), and location of
residence, i.e., urban dummy.
The dependent variables in column 1 and 2 are binary indicator for enrollment in grade 1 by age
7 and the natural logarithm of age at enrollment in grade 1, respectively.
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schools. The majority of the studies on primary education in developing countries
focus on enrollment rates, without considering the timing of enrollment. Delaying
primary school enrollment beyond the legal enrollment age, however, is more of a
norm than an exception in these countries. Prior studies have documented that
delaying enrollment is costly as it, for instance, decreases an individual's life time
wealth (Glewwe & Jacoby, 1995), and it increases both school dropout and grade
repetition rates (Wils, 2004). Though delayed enrollment is widely observed in
developing countries and there is a high cost associated with it, the literature on the
topic is limited, and we have a limited understanding of why children delay
enrollment in primary school. This essay attempts to ll the gap in the literature by
investigating the eect of access to primary school on the timing of enrollment in
primary school.
Identifying the causal eect of access to primary school on the timing of
enrollment is complicated by endogeneity of access to primary school. For instance,
parents who choose to live at closer proximity to school may have strong taste for
education and enroll their children in school on time regardless of proximity to
school. To mitigate biases due to endogeneity of access to school, I exploit the
education reform in Ethiopia as exogenous source of variation in access to primary
school. Then, I estimated dierence-in-dierences model where the dependent
variable is a binary indicator for enrollment in primary school by age 7, the legal
enrollment age in Ethiopia, and the natural logarithm of age at enrollment in
primary school.
The average treatment eect is estimated to be between 35% and 45%,
suggesting the probability the child enrolls in primary school on time has increased
by between 35% and 45% as a result of the education reform. The log duration
regression (where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of age at
enrollment), on the other hand, suggests that the reform has decreased age at
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enrollment in grade 1 by about 4 months. These estimates highlight an important
role that access to school plays in inducing parents to enroll their kids in primary
school at the legal enrollment age.
The ndings reported here are important as they show that, in Ethiopia,
education intervention has been eective in decreasing age at enrollment in primary
school. The intervention was meant to increase primary school enrollment, but it
also induced households to enroll their children in primary school at a relatively
younger age. The Ethiopian government provides free primary education. Thus,
households do not have to pay for tuition. Households, however, still have to incur
other costs related to school attendance, including the child's opportunity cost of
time in terms of forgone family income from child labor.
Making schools accessible to poor households would decrease the time the
child spends walking to school, and hence decreases the opportunity cost of school
attendance. Moreover, accessibility induces physically weaker children to attend
school since it decreases the physical strength needed to walk the distance to school.
Policy makers, thus, should also consider improving communication networks and
public transport as alternative/additional ways to encourage households to enroll
their kids in primary school on time.
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Appendix A
ESSAY 1
A.1 Technical Notes
Specication of Bivariate Probit Model
Equations (1.7) and (1.8) which are presented in Section 1.5 specify the latent
parental utility derived from allocating child i0s time on school and child labor in
year t as
sit = sb orderit + sfamily sizeit + sXit + is + its; (A.1)
lit = lb orderit + lfamily sizeit + lXit + il + itl;
where its and itl are random error terms which are jointly and normally distributed
with means zero, variances one, and correlation , and all the other notations are as
discussed in Section 1.5. The bivariate probit model species the observed outcome
as
sit =
8><>: 1 if s

it > 0
0 if sit  0;
lit =
8><>: 1 if l

it > 0
0 if lit  0;
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If the two error terms are uncorrelated (i.e.,  = 0), the model collapses to separate
probit models. If, on the other hand,  6= 0, then bivariate probit model is
appropriate. For notational simplicity, let us suppress individual and time
subscripts i and t, and also denote the vector of explanatory variables including
family size and birth order (and coecients) in the school attendance and child
labor equations, respectively, by Ws (and s) and Wl (and l). The joint
probabilities of, say, s = 1 and l = 1 (i.e., p11) can now be stated as
p11 = Pr(s = 1; l = 1); (A.2)
= Pr(s > 0; l > 0);
= Pr(s <Wss; l <Wll);
=
Z Wss
 1
Z Wll
 1
(zs; zl; )dzsdzl;
= (zs; zl; );
where (:) and (:) are, respectively, the standardized bivariate normal density and
the cumulative density function for (zs; zl). Following Greene (2008), we can state
the other three possible outcomes as
pjk = Pr(s = j; l = k); (A.3)
= (qsWss; qlWll; qsql);
where qs = 1 if s = 1 and qs =  1 if s = 0; similarly, ql = 1 if l = 1 and ql =  1 if
l = 0. The log-likelihood function for the bivariate probit model is, thus:
lnL =
X
i
(qsWss; qlWll; qsql): (A.4)
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Equation (A.4) is estimated using maximum likelihood procedure. The marginal
eects of a change in birth order on the probabilities of school attendance and child
labor are, respectively, given by
@s(:)
@b orderit
= s(:)  ^s;
@l(:)
@b orderit
= 1(:)  ^l;
where ^s and ^l are the coecient estimates of birth order in school attendance and
child labor equations, respectively, and where (:) and (:) with subscripts s and l
denote the univariate standard normal cumulative distribution function and the
marginal standard normal density, respectively. The estimated average marginal
eect is simply the average over all observations, evaluated at the maximum
likelihood estimates of unknown parameters.
As discussed in Section 1.5, one of the crucial issues that needs to be
addressed is estimating this model is potential endogeneity of family size. A variable
which records the proportion of boys in the family is used to instrument family size
and unobserved eect bivariate probit instrumental variable (IV) model is estimated
to mitigate potential endogeneity. The IV approach in the context of the non-linear
model discussed above is implemented using, as Terza et al. (2008) called it,
two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) procedure. The procedure in 2SRI and two-stage
least square (2SLS) regression are the same except that in 2SRI the endogenous
variable is not replaced by its predicted value in the second stage equation. Instead,
the predicted residual from the rst stage regression is included as an additional
variable in the second stage equation. More specically, the following rst stage
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equation is rst estimated:
family sizeit = 0 + 1proportion of boysit + 2b orderit + 3Xit +  i + it;
where all notations are as discussed in Section 1.5. Then, the predicted residual
from this regression is included as an additional explanatory variable in the second
stage equation, i.e., equation (A.4). This is implemented in Stata using Generalized
Linear Latent and Mixed Models (GLLAMM) program, which is discussed in detail
in Rabe Hesketh (2008)
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A.2 Additional Tables
Table A.1: List and Description of Variables Used in Estimation of the Eect of Birth Order
on Children's time Allocation
Variable Description
Dependent variables
school attendance (yes=1) =1 if a child attends school; 0 otherwise
working child (yes=1) =1 if a child works as a child laborer;
0 otherwise
Independent variables
birth order =1 for a rst-born child, =2 for a second-born
child, etc
proportion of boys Ratio of number of boys to number of kids in
the family
support on family planning =1 if a hh received support on family planning;
0 otherwise
number of kids Number of children in the household
child is a girl (yes=1) =1 if a child is girl; 0 otherwise
child's age child's (aged between 7 and 15) age in
completed years
housemaid (yes=1) =1 if a family hired a housemaid; 0 otherwise
fathers schooling Highest grade completed by the father
mother's schooling Highest grade completed by the mother
household expenditure Annual household expenditure in 2005 prices
(in 10,000s)
urban (yes=1) =1 if the household is located in urban area;
0 otherwise
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Table A.2: Marginal and Joint Frequencies for School Attendance and Child Labor
Child Labor
School Attendance No Yes Total
% % %
No 1.3 8.9 10.2
Yes 20.1 69.8 89.8
Total 21.4 78.6 100.0
Source: Author calculation
Table A.3: Child Labor Specialization by Gender
Gender
Type of Work Boy Girl Total
% % %
Domestic Work 23.2 76.8 100.0
Unpaid Work 80.6 19.4 100.0
Caring for Others 31.0 69.0 100.0
Paid Work 52.3 47.7 100.0
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Table A.4: Fraction of Families with Additional Child by Parity and Sex Mix
Mean SD N
Sex mix of the rst 3 births in families of 3 or more
3 boys 0.90 0.29 152
2 boys, 1 girl 0.89 0.31 557
1 boy, 2 girls 0.89 0.32 505
3 girls 0.84 0.37 137
Sex mix of the rst 4 births in families of 4 or more
4 boys 0.74 0.44 80
3 boys, 1 girl 0.80 0.40 275
2 boys, 2 girls 0.80 0.40 464
1 boy, 3 girls 0.78 0.41 260
4 girls 0.72 0.45 60
Sex mix of the rst 5 births in families of 5 or more
5 boys 0.61 0.49 25
4 boys, 1 girl 0.73 0.45 100
3 boys, 2 girls 0.72 0.45 195
2 boys, 3 girls 0.55 0.50 205
1 boy, 4 girls 0.72 0.45 103
5 girls 0.93 0.26 23
Sex mix of the rst 6 births in families of 6 or more
6 boys 0.77 0.44 14
5 boys, 1 girl 0.73 0.45 45
4 boys, 2 girls 0.58 0.49 100
3 boys, 3 girls 0.52 0.50 112
2 boys, 4 girls 0.61 0.49 96
1 boy, 5 girls 0.73 0.44 39
6 girls 0.70 0.47 13
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Table A.5: Independent Pooled Probit Estimates of School Attendance and Child Labor
Equations
School Equation Child Labor Equation
birth order -0.028 (0.047) -0.186 (0.039)
number of kids -0.029 (0.043) 0.125 (0.036)
Child's age = 8 0.577 (0.185) 0.368 (0.183)
Child's age = 9 1.184 (0.203) 0.591 (0.191)
Child's age = 10 1.190 (0.194) 0.551 (0.189)
Child's age = 11 1.958 (0.226) 0.839 (0.168)
Child's age = 12 1.659 (0.197) 0.863 (0.170)
Child's age = 13 1.324 (0.302) 0.830 (0.264)
Child's age = 14 1.753 (0.292) 0.911 (0.227)
Child's age = 15 1.366 (0.264) 0.711 (0.222)
child is a girl (yes=1) 0.154 (0.097) 0.196 (0.078)
housemaid (yes=1) 0.120 (0.211) -0.391 (0.171)
father's schooling 0.059 (0.021) -0.031 (0.014)
mother's schooling -0.022 (0.027) 0.001 (0.014)
household expenditure 0.059 (0.091) -0.075 (0.041)
urban (yes=1) 1.070 (0.720) -0.668 (0.373)
Observations 1790 1860
Log Likelihood -455.830 -667.514
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Standard errors (SE) are reported in parentheses. Village and year dummies
are included as additional control variables.
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Table A.7: Pooled Bivariate Probit Estimates of School Attendance and Child Labor Equa-
tions
School Equation Child Labor Equation
birth order -0.030 (0.05) -0.188 (0.04)
number of kids -0.031 (0.04) 0.125 (0.04)
Child's age = 8 0.576 (0.19) 0.378 (0.18)
Child's age = 9 1.176 (0.20) 0.595 (0.19)
Child's age = 10 1.176 (0.19) 0.554 (0.19)
Child's age = 11 1.943 (0.22) 0.841 (0.17)
Child's age = 12 1.629 (0.20) 0.855 (0.17)
Child's age = 13 1.295 (0.30) 0.838 (0.26)
Child's age = 14 1.728 (0.29) 0.910 (0.23)
Child's age = 15 1.324 (0.26) 0.708 (0.22)
child is a girl (yes=1) 0.138 (0.10) 0.197 (0.08)
father's schooling 0.060 (0.02) -0.031 (0.01)
mother's schooling -0.022 (0.03) 0.001 (0.01)
household expenditure 0.066 (0.09) -0.076 (0.04)
urban (yes=1) 1.057 (0.71) -0.687 (0.38)
Constant -0.079 (0.89) -1.124 (0.50)
athrho
Constant -0.230 (0.09)
Observations 1860
Log likelihood -1119.195
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Standard errors (SE) are reported in parentheses. Village dummies, a year
dummy, and a dummy variable for the presence of housemaid are included as
additional control variables.
Note: As stated in Stata documentation, in the maximum likelihood estima-
tion,  is not directly estimated, but atanh  (i.e., athrho constant in the
table) is, where atanh  = 12 ln (
1+
1  ). If atanh  is statistically signicantly
dierent from zero, then bivariate probit model is a better t than univariate
independent probit models. The estimate of the untransformed  is -.226
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A.3 Additional Graphs
Figure A.1: Hours Spent in School and Working by Birth Order
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Appendix B
ESSAY 2
B.1 Additional Tables
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Table B.1: List and Description of Variables Used in Estimation of the Eect of the Edu-
cation Reform on the Timing of School Enrollment
Variable Description
Dependent variables
Enrolled in grade 1 by age 7 (yes=1) =1 if a child is enrolled in grade 1 at
age  7; 0 otherwise
Age at enrollment Age in years by the time a child
enrolled in grade 1
Independent variables
Treated =1 if state level primary school
enrollment rate is  30 ; 0 otherwise
After =1 if year=2004; 0 otherwise
Girl (yes=1) =1 if a child is a girl; 0 otherwise
Birth order =1 for a rst-born child, =2 for a
second-born child, etc
Household size Total number of people who live
in the household
Dad's years of schooling Highest grade completed by the
father
Mom's years of schooling Highest grade completed by the
mother
Dad's age Father's age in years
Mom's age Mother's age in years
hh has piped water (yes=1) =1 if the household has piped water;
0 otherwise
hh has electricity (yes=1) =1 if the household has electricity;
0 otherwise
hh has pit latrine (yes=1) =1 if the household has pit latrine;
0 otherwise
hh owns land (yes=1) =1 if any member of the household
owns any land holdings
hh owns farm animal (yes=1) =1 if the household owns farm
animals; 0 otherwise
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proportion of hhs with piped water Proportion of households with
piped water
proportion of hhs with electricity Proportion of households with
electricity
proportion of hhs with pit latrine Proportion of households with
pit latrine
proportion of hhs with land Proportion of households that
owns land
proportion of hhs with farm animal Proportion of households that
owns farm animal
Log (Household expenditure) Log of annual total household
expenditure in 2005 prices
Unemployment rate State level unemployment rate
Urban area (yes=1) =1 if the household is located in
urban area; 0 otherwise
Table B.2: Fraction of Children Enrolled in Grade 1 by Age 7 by Treatment Group Before
and After the Program
Before the Change After the Change Time Dierence
Treated Group 0.114 0.193 0.079
(0.018) (0.016) (0.026)
Untreated Group 0.505 0.530 0.026
(0.034) (0.030) (0.045)
Group Dierence -0.391 -0.338 0.053
(0.035) (0.031)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses
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Table B.3: Dierence-in-Dierences Estimates of the Eect of the Education Reform on
On-time School Enrollment
Dependent Variable: Binary Indicator for Enrollment in Grade 1 by Age 7
(1) (2)
LPM Probit
Treated (yes=1) -0.391 -0.365
(0.037) (0.033)
After (yes=1) 0.026 0.019
(0.045) (0.034)
Treated*After 0.053 0.082
(0.050) (0.046)
Constant 0.505
(0.033)
Observations 2372 2372
R-sq 0.142
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Reported coecients are average marginal eects.
Robust standard errors are clustered by enumeration area, the
primary sampling unit, and are reported in parentheses.
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Table B.4: Gross Primary School Enrollment Rate in Ethiopia by Year
Year %
1981 37.93
1982 41.28
1983 42.45
1984 40.96
1985 38.37
1986 38.06
1987 41.34
1988 42.27
1989 40.53
1990 36.56
1991 32.77
1992 26.40
1993 22.81
1994 26.95
1995 30.87
1996 36.91
1997 42.10
1998 51.47
1999 50.30
2000 54.92
2001 60.46
2002 63.41
2003 64.95
2004 68.51
2005 81.01
2006 86.97
2007 94.71
2008 102.33
2009 102.28
2010 101.55
Source: World Bank
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Table B.5: Dierence-in-Dierences Estimates of the Eect of the Education Reform on
On-time School Enrollment
Dependent Variable: Binary Indicator for Enrollment in Grade 1 by Age 7
(1) (2)
LPM Probit
Treated (yes=1) 0.037 -0.307
(0.120) (0.138)
After (yes=1) -0.208 -0.217
(0.159) (0.135)
Treated*After 0.352 0.364
(0.173) (0.189)
Girl (yes=1) -0.018 -0.018
(0.016) (0.015)
Birth order 0.096 0.107
(0.008) (0.008)
Household size -0.053 -0.060
(0.005) (0.006)
Dad's years of schooling 0.013 0.010
(0.004) (0.003)
Mom's years of schooling 0.015 0.009
(0.005) (0.004)
Dad's age -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
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Mom's age -0.012 -0.014
(0.002) (0.002)
hh has piped water (yes=1) 0.073 0.065
(0.038) (0.033)
hh has electricity (yes=1) 0.143 0.090
(0.068) (0.059)
hh has pit latrine (yes=1) 0.066 0.059
(0.028) (0.024)
hh owns land (yes=1) -0.012 -0.001
(0.047) (0.037)
hh owns farm animal (yes=1) -0.055 -0.053
(0.033) (0.030)
proportion of hhs with piped water -0.068 -0.063
(0.050) (0.045)
proportion of hhs with electricity -0.195 -0.134
(0.089) (0.077)
proportion of hhs with pit latrine -0.044 -0.031
(0.044) (0.042)
proportion of hhs with land -0.085 -0.077
(0.075) (0.059)
proportion of hhs with farm animal 0.118 0.118
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(0.057) (0.054)
Urban area (yes=1) 0.193 0.146
(0.049) (0.038)
Constant 0.669
(0.127)
State xed eects Yes Yes
State-by-year xed eects Yes Yes
Observations 2372 2372
R-sq 0.243
Log Likelihood -1000.591
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Reported coecients are average marginal eects.
Robust standard errors are clustered by enumeration area, the
primary sampling unit, and are reported in parentheses.
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Table B.6: Dierence-in-Dierences Estimates of the Eect of the Education Reform on
On-time School Enrollment
(1) (2)
Enrollment Status Log(Age at Enrollment)
Treated (yes=1) -0.307 0.158
(0.138) (0.055)
After (yes=1) -0.217 0.145
(0.135) (0.060)
Treated*After 0.364 -0.197
(0.189) (0.068)
Girl (yes=1) -0.018 0.002
(0.015) (0.008)
Birth order 0.107 -0.087
(0.008) (0.004)
Household size -0.060 0.046
(0.006) (0.003)
Dad's years of schooling 0.010 -0.006
(0.003) (0.002)
Mom's years of schooling 0.009 -0.010
(0.004) (0.002)
Dad's age -0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
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Mom's age -0.014 0.010
(0.002) (0.001)
hh has piped water (yes=1) 0.065 -0.037
(0.033) (0.018)
hh has electricity (yes=1) 0.090 -0.047
(0.059) (0.031)
hh has pit latrine (yes=1) 0.059 -0.013
(0.024) (0.014)
hh owns land (yes=1) -0.001 0.007
(0.037) (0.020)
hh owns farm animal (yes=1) -0.053 -0.002
(0.030) (0.016)
proportion of hhs with piped water -0.063 0.039
(0.045) (0.025)
proportion of hhs with electricity -0.134 0.040
(0.077) (0.044)
proportion of hhs with pit latrine -0.031 0.009
(0.042) (0.024)
proportion of hhs with land -0.077 0.049
(0.059) (0.035)
proportion of hhs with farm animal 0.118 -0.013
99
(0.054) (0.030)
Urban area (yes=1) 0.146 -0.075
(0.038) (0.024)
Constant 1.541
(0.061)
State xed eects Yes Yes
State-by-year xed eects Yes Yes
Observations 2372 2372
R-sq 0.384
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Robust standard errors are clustered by enumeration area, the primary sampling unit, and are
reported in parentheses.
The dependent variables in column 1 and 2 are binary indicator for enrollment in grade 1 by age
7 and age at enrollment in grade 1, respectively.
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B.2 Additional Graphs
Figure B.1: Histogram and Kernel Density of the Treatment Eect, Rural Sample
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Figure B.2: Histogram and Kernel Density of the Treatment Eect, Urban Sample
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